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To : Permanent Representatives

From : Deputy Secretary General

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

The purpose of the present paper is to review the Council's discussion since the summer recess of Berlin Contingency Planning, and to suggest how the Council might handle this problem, which is one of the greatest complexity, in future meetings.

I. INTRODUCTION

2. At the present time the Council has before it -

(a) The Supreme Commanders' military contingency plans, together with an appraisal of these plans by the S.G., in consultation with the Military Committee (SGM-479-62) transmitted in accordance with the instructions given to the NATO military authorities by the Council in Resolution C-M(61)104 of 9th November, 1961.

(b) A paper by the Three Powers with special responsibilities in Berlin concerning Relationships between NATO and the three Powers in the Planning and Control of Berlin Contingency Operations ~~(CTS.62/1)~~ (CTS 62-9).

(c) A quadripartite paper presented by the United Kingdom, United States, France and Germany on the Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in a Berlin Crisis ~~(CT.62/10)~~ (PO/62/593).

3. These three sets of papers form the main basis of the Council's consideration of the Berlin problem although, as indicated later, their formal status is not identical. All three have given rise to comments and requests for clarification on the part of member governments. Although the problems raised under each are closely interrelated, the simplest method of approaching the task described in paragraph 1 may be to examine the follow-up action required as far as possible under the broad subject heading

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represented by each of the three sets of papers. There are, however, some outstanding issues which cannot conveniently fit in under these headings: these are dealt with in a separate section at the end of this note.

II. MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANS

4. C-M(61)104 laid down in paragraph 7 that "the [military contingency] plans will be sent to the Standing Group for appraisal in consultation with the Military Committee in accordance with established NATO procedure and forwarded to the North Atlantic Council for approval through Permanent Representatives". The exact form in which such approval is given is clearly of considerable importance. In the Council's discussion so far there seems to be a wide measure of agreement that the plans should be regarded as a "catalogue" of possible measures from which selection could be made by the Alliance in the event that the Berlin situation deteriorated to such a point that military action by NATO forces was indicated. At least one delegation (Belgium) has intimated that it is already in a position to give its approval to the plans on this basis.

5. However, it has been represented by another delegation (United Kingdom) that the first action required by the Council is to determine whether the plans are responsive to the Council's instructions contained in C-M(61)104. The NATO military authorities in paragraph 19 of SGM-479-62 have stated "From a military viewpoint the BERCON and MARCON plans appear to be responsive to the instructions of the North Atlantic Council and to the needs which these instructions have sought to fulfil".

6. Another delegation (Canada) has asked for more information about the selective use of nuclear weapons envisaged in the BERCON plans. Specifically, it has asked: "What plans do the military authorities have as to possible targets; as to the use of such weapons on land, sea or in the air, and as to the size of weapons which might be used". In formulating this question, the Canadian Delegation has pointed out that if the selective use of nuclear weapons involved a direct threat to the USSR rather than being directly related to access to Berlin, it might be difficult to differentiate such selective use from the initiation of general hostilities.

7. Up to the present no other delegation has put forward any specific request for clarification with regard to the plans themselves or the Standing Group appraisal, or indicated that it would like to see any of the proposed plans modified, or new plans developed. If there are any further enquiries or suggestions in this sense, it is hoped that they can be put forward without delay for examination by the NATO military authorities. In the absence of such, it is suggested:-

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8. (a) that the NATO military authorities should be requested to furnish replies to the Canadian enquiries mentioned above;

(b) that subject to satisfaction on the points raised under (a), a formula on the lines set out below might be adopted as a Council decision:-

(i) "The Council took note of the Standing Group appraisal of the Berlin contingency plans proposed by the Major NATO Commanders(1) and agreed that these were responsive to the instructions to the NATO military authorities conveyed in Council Resolution C-M(61)104".

(ii) "The Council approved the Major NATO Commanders' plans in the BERCON and MARCON series on the basis that these represent a catalogue of plans for possible action by NATO forces in the event that the efforts of the Three Powers to maintain access to Berlin in accordance with the LIVE OAK plans are unsuccessful - the selection and execution of any one of these plans being subject to a prior political decision by member governments at the time."

(iii) "Should this catalogue of plans require revision or amplification in the light of changing circumstances, any significant amendments should be submitted to the Council by the NATO military authorities for approval on the same basis as the present catalogue."

III. "RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATO AND THE THREE POWERS IN THE PLANNING AND CONTROL OF BERLIN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS"

9. This question, which is of great importance, since it concerns the conditions and circumstances in which NATO would assume collective responsibility for the conduct of any military operations which might become necessary in connection with the Berlin crisis, was first brought before the Council in March, when the Three Powers tabled a paper containing their recommendations. At the Council meeting of 11th April a spokesman of the Three Powers replied to a number of questions put at the first discussion. Following this meeting the Canadian and Italian Delegations submitted in writing further comments with a request for clarifications contained in the Three-Power paper. On 15th September the United States Delegation circulated on behalf of the Three Powers written comments in response to the questions raised (CTS.62/9), and on 18th September transmitted a revised version of their original paper (CTS.62/1) containing amendments in paragraphs 5 and 9(c) (5(b) and 2(b) of original document).

(1) SACEUR: SHAPE/70/62 and SHAPE/70/A/62 of 10th September, 1962.
SACLANT: 3011/C-982 of 15th August, 1962.
CINCHAN: Ch. 001107/8 of 2nd April, 1962.

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10. In the debate on 27th September and in a subsequent letter to the International Staff, the Canadian Representative put the following question: "The Canadian authorities understand 'LIVE OAK' planning to include a progression from unarmed probes to limited hostilities. Since the latter would obviously involve the responsibility of all the NATO governments, would it not be better to have a clearer understanding of the point at which transfer from tripartite to NATO control would take place? For example, rather than link transfer of control to a point which would require calling for NATO reinforcements for a stalled tripartite probe, would it not be better to establish NATO control of military operations as soon as the intention of the Soviet Government to use force to hinder access to Berlin had been established?".

11. In the same debate the Belgium Permanent Representative asked whether the Three Powers were in agreement with the statement in paragraph 7(c) of PO/62/581 that control of any military operation concerning access to Berlin should be transferred to NATO. It should perhaps be noted in this connection that in paragraph 7(c) of PO/62/581 the Secretary General did not intend to suggest modifying the sense of the proposals in the Three Power paper, but merely to draw attention to the need for an agreement on the subject matter, whether in the terms proposed by the Three Powers themselves or in a form amended or amplified as necessary to take account of the observations of other member countries.

To sum up, the following action appears to be required under this heading.

(a) The Delegations which sought further clarification following the meeting of 11th April should signify whether the replies contained in the Three Power reply of 15th September are satisfactory to them.

(b) The Three Powers should comment in reply to the questions raised by the Canadian and Belgian Delegations at the meeting of 27th September.

(c) Subject to the Delegations concerned receiving replies satisfactory to them on (a) and (b) above, the Council should agree on the definition of NATO and Tripartite planning responsibilities, and on the proposals for transfer of control from Tripartite to NATO mechanism contained in the Three Power paper of 18th September.

IV. "PREFERRED SEQUENCE OF ACTION"

12. As made clear by Mr. Nitze in his presentation of 19th September, a primary purpose of the Four Power paper (CTS-62-10) was to place LIVE OAK and NATO military contingency plans in a correct time perspective by suggesting how they might fit into the whole complex of Western action in a Berlin crisis. At the same

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time the Four Powers have stated that their paper should not be regarded as a set of proposals or forecast of events requiring formal endorsement of approval by the Council. It was presented rather as a background for Council consideration of Berlin military contingency plans and the NATO-Tripartite relationship problem, with the object of eliciting the views of member governments and in the hope that it could be accepted as representing a consensus of opinion. Unless any member government is in fundamental disagreement with the concepts underlying the document, particularly as regards the phasing and grouping of possible measures within those phases, it is suggested that the Council may wish to accept this paper as a general framework for its continuing discussion of the overall problem of co-ordinating the actions and policies of the Allies in the event of a worsening of the Berlin situation.

13. Initial reactions of member governments to the paper have shown that it raises some important points in the non-military sphere on which further discussion or elucidation appears to be necessary. The main points may perhaps be summarised as follows:-

Political contingency plans

14. A number of Permanent Representatives have referred to the need for the Council further to discuss political and other non-military contingency planning in connection with Berlin and have suggested that there should be a catalogue of possible political plans of action in parallel to the military plans. In this respect specific points raised in the course of Council discussion included:

(a) Measures to be taken in the event of the signature by the Soviet Union of a separate peace treaty with the Pankow régime. The Four Powers have indicated that proposals in this sense would shortly be brought before the Council for discussion. (These will presumably revise and bring up-to-date the proposals already circulated to the Council at its meeting of 18th September, 1961, in the report of the Four Power Foreign Ministers meeting in Washington of 14th - 16th September, 1961).

Under these circumstances would the Council prefer to await the Four Power paper, or to have an exchange of views on this problem in anticipation of the Four Power proposals?

(b) Diplomatic action in LIVE OAK context. In view of the need for the closest co-ordination of member countries' actions and thus ensuring solidarity within the Alliance, a number of delegations have expressed interest in the nature of the diplomatic measures envisaged by the Three Powers in parallel with any LIVE OAK operations.

The Three Powers will no doubt wish to comment.

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(c) Plans for action in the United Nations, whether on Western initiative or in the event of a Soviet initiative, in various circumstances, e.g. if the General Assembly is in session. The basis on which the Three Powers are planning to present their case.

Would the Council prefer to await the Three Power proposals or to exchange views on this problem in anticipation thereof?

(d) Precautions to be taken in order to ensure that the Soviets suitably interpret the various possible measures contemplated in the military and non-military field. In particular, what plans exist for keeping open channels of communication with the Soviet Government?

The Three Powers may wish to comment on this issue insofar as this problem might arise as a result of action taken under their own responsibility. In a situation where NATO-wide action was involved, the problem of possible Soviet misinterpretation must presumably be taken into account in reaching a decision within the Alliance as and when the need for such a decision arises.

The Council may wish in due course to place this consideration on formal record.

(e) The Four Powers have undertaken to put before the Council a paper addressed to the particular problem of possible interference with German access to Berlin, e.g. in such fields as visas, Customs control, etc.

If the timing is suitable the Council may wish to look at this problem together with that of a separate Soviet/GDR peace treaty (see (a) above), with which it is clearly closely linked.

Economic Contingency Plans

15. In the Four Power paper reference is made to the possible application of economic countermeasures under Phase II. Examination of possible countermeasures was initiated in August last year, and following lengthy discussionsin the Special Working Group of the Committees of Economic and Political Advisers and in the Council, a large measure of common agreement was obtained.

16. On 17th April last, the Secretary General circulated a note PO/62/260 taking stock of the results so far obtained and suggesting further action. This note contained a certain number of draft decisions on various issues where there appeared to be common understanding. After a brief discussion at a meeting of the Council on 5th June 1962, some minor amendments were submitted by delegations. These amendments, which did not appear to raise any difficulties, were circulated in PO/62/436 of 19th July.

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17. In view of the renewed urgency for obtaining agreement on action to be taken in the non-military field in connection with a Berlin crisis, the subject of economic countermeasures will be placed on the agenda of the Council at an early date.

V. MISCELLANEOUS

18. There are certain problems which have been touched on in recent Council discussion and which do not fit conveniently under any of the three major headings so far mentioned. Among these are the following:-

Alerts

19. It will be recalled that under paragraph 10(a) of C-M(61)104 the military authorities were instructed to study urgently "appropriate alert measures for NATO forces prior to the initiation of any Tripartite military measures". In submitting their BERCON and MARCON plans, the Major NATO Commanders have complied with this instruction, indicating the need from a military point of view for the declaration of a state of military vigilance, the major part of the Simple Alert system and selected measures from the reinforced alert system before certain contingency plans can be executed. The Four Power paper on "preferred sequence of action" indicates where the adoption of alert measures might fit into the scheme of action under Phases I and II.

20. In the Council discussion of 19th September the spokesman of the Four Powers (Mr. Nitze) had suggested that "the Council should now give prompt and prior consideration to the whole question of alerts, the powers of governments, their responsibilities to Parliaments, and whether their possibilities of action corresponded to SACEUR's requirements."

21. The comments of other representatives (which will not be enumerated in detail) implied that the alert problem in the Berlin context raised very sensitive political issues for certain member governments. Inter alia it was pointed out that the setting into motion of the formal NATO alert systems would reveal to the Soviets the nature of NATO's preparations for war. It was further suggested that the application of certain alert measures, e.g. mobilisation, could easily in themselves contribute to sharpening international tension and present even greater risks of political escalation, than selected military actions. It also appears to be doubted by some delegations as to whether alert measures need to be applied to NATO forces across the board, as opposed to, say, units stationed in Germany alone. The general tenor of these observations suggests that a careful examination will need to be made of what alert measures should be applied, and when and where, in the Berlin context, in order to achieve the simultaneous purposes of placing the NATO military

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forces in a position to implement BERCON and/or MARCON plans and to react effectively in the event of unanticipated escalation, as well as of conveying to the Soviet Union the necessary warning without risk of misinterpretation.

22. Meanwhile, since the last Council meeting on Berlin, the Standing Group have informed the International Staff that they have under preparation a paper addressed to the specific problem of alerts in connection with Berlin. This paper is expected to be available for distribution within the next two or three weeks.

23. In addition, the Standing Group have circulated under reference SGM-528-62 of 21st September a report on the general status of the Supreme Commanders' negotiations with member countries on the NATO alert systems. This latter paper gives an assessment of the military effects of the unwillingness, or in some cases inability for constitutional reasons, of member countries to delegate to Major NATO Commanders powers which they ask in order to make the alert system effective and realistic. Although it has no direct connection with Berlin, it may nevertheless provide a valuable background to any detailed examination of the Berlin problem. This paper is on the Council's agenda for 11th October, when it will be introduced by a briefing from representatives of SACEUR and SACLANT.

24. It was with all the foregoing in mind that the Acting Secretary General was prompted to suggest at the Council meeting on 29th September that consideration might be given in due course to set up a special working group to look into the alerts problem in its application to Berlin contingency planning.

25. Finally, it will be recalled that in paragraph 14(c) of SGM-479-62 the military authorities draw attention to the possible need for activating some of the wartime organizations for shipping in the event that it were decided to implement certain of the maritime contingency plans. Other civilian wartime organizations and activities may similarly be involved in the event of any decision to increase the readiness of NATO forces.

26. Proposed follow-up action:

(a) Council discussion of the general problems arising from the NATO alert system should take place as planned on 11th October, preceded by briefings by SACEUR and SACLANT.

(b) The NATO military authorities should be invited to forward as soon as possible their paper now under preparation on Alert Measures in the context of Berlin Contingency Planning.

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(c) On receipt of this paper the Council should decide whether it would be desirable to set up a special working group with participation of the military authorities and experts as necessary, from capitals.

Consultation in the Council

27. A number of Permanent Representatives have drawn particular attention to the problem of keeping the Council informed in an emergency over Berlin, in order that it should be in a position to take any necessary political decisions in full knowledge of latest developments in the political and military fields and of possible consequences of any measures which might be initiated by the Three Powers. In their paper on NATO/Tripartite Relationships, the Three Powers have made it clear that, time permitting, they will be ready "to advise and enter into consultation with the North Atlantic Council prior to implementing LIVE OAK plans". Moreover, in C-M(61)104, paragraph 8, it is stated that "the execution of any of the NATO military contingency plans will be subject to decisions by governments at the time". Finally, to the extent that certain alert measures may require to be taken in connection with both LIVE OAK and BERCON/MARCON plans, and within the framework of action under phases I and II of the "Preferred Sequence of Action", it is self-evident that all NATO governments will automatically have to be consulted. The problem accordingly appears to be one of establishing a procedure by which the Major NATO Commanders concerned and the Three (or the Four) Powers can maintain regular contact with the Council.

28. In this connection the attention of Permanent Representatives is drawn to Mr. Spaak's PO/59/404 of 11th March, 1959, in which he re-circulated his predecessor's paper PO/56/1085 on the Council in Emergency. The Council may wish to re-examine this document and decide whether the procedures it suggested are appropriate to the Berlin situation.

Legal implications of MARCON and BERCON (DELTA) planning

29. A study prepared by the Legal Adviser to the International Staff, as foreshadowed in paragraph 5(c) of PO/62/581, has now been circulated to delegations under a covering note from the Deputy Secretary General(1). Consideration of how further to deal with this problem should be deferred until the preliminary comments and reactions of delegations are available.

Supplementary Tripartitie Maritime Plans

30. On 19th September the spokesman of the Three Powers informed the Council that national or Tripartite naval measures under Phase II of the "Preferred sequence of action" were under examination and that these would complement MARCON plans. It was stated that the proposed measures would be referred to the Council in the near future.

(Signed) G. COLONNA

(1) PO/62/637