

COSMIC TOP SECRET

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH  
9th November, 1962

CHEF D'ARCHIVES

ANNEX to  
SUMMARY RECORD  
C-R(62)53  
Limited distribution

CTS 1963

CTS 1964

+ CORRIGENDUM, dated: 12-XI-6

Restricted Annex to summary record of a meeting of  
the Council held on Wednesday, 31st October, 1962

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANS

Documents: Draft Decision dated 31st October, 1962

CTS 62-9 ✓  
PO/62/593 ✓  
PO/62/280 0X0 ✓

1. The CHAIRMAN made the following statement:

"At their meeting of 22nd October, the Council instructed the International Staff to prepare, in consultation with individual delegations, a draft decision for consideration by the Council in connection with the military contingency plans for Berlin. This has now been done and the text of the draft decision has been circulated to all Permanent Representatives.

"I hope that the Council will now be able to agree on this text, thereby recording a first conclusion arising from the current discussion on the military contingency plans for Berlin. Of course this agreement would be given by the Council in the light of the statements made by the Standing Group Representative and circulated under PO/62/680.

"In inviting the Council's agreement on the draft resolution before your eyes, I feel that I should make it clear that, as I said, this would be a first conclusion in a wide-ranging and continuing programme of work in connection with Berlin. The essential significance of the decision, which I ask you to take today, is that it would enable the military authorities to proceed with the development of their planning. At the same time it is in no sense intended to prejudge the discussion or solution of other closely related issues, which are still on our agenda.

"In particular, it is clear that we shall have to proceed with the study of legal implications of certain of the maritime contingency plans. So far only one delegation has commented on the paper prepared by the International Staff Legal Adviser;

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I hope that others will equally wish to contribute their own thoughts in the near future. Having in mind the preoccupation expressed by certain Permanent Representatives, I am convinced that the Council [REDACTED] at its disposal the fullest possible knowledge of the legal implications of the contingency plans so that should the Council ever be faced with choosing a plan from the present catalogue, it would be in a position to weigh not only the political and military advantages and disadvantages, but also the legal considerations which would have to be taken into account in deciding to execute any particular action. In each case no final determination is likely to be possible in abstraction from the circumstances prevailing at the time of decision. We must, therefore, be prepared to revert to this particular problem when we know more of the reactions of member governments to the Legal Adviser's initial study.

"On the other hand, we have, as you know, the problem of alerts, which we shall have an opportunity to discuss further in the near future in the specific context of the Berlin contingency plans; we also have the question of transfer of responsibility for military operations from the Three Powers to NATO in a Berlin crisis. On this point a reply was given on 12th October by the United States Representative, speaking on behalf of the Three Powers, to the question raised by the Canadian Permanent Representative. The Canadian point in question was recorded in paragraph 10 of PO/62/641. The statement made by the United States Delegate, which was circulated in writing to all delegations, was followed by a short and helpful background statement by the Director of the LIVE O.K. Planning Staff. The Representatives of Canada, Italy, Belgium and Turkey undertook to convey the sense of this reply to their governments. If there are no further points to be cleared up in this connection, I take it that the Council is agreeable to "take note, as a basis for further planning, of the Three Power recommendations concerning relationships between NATO and the Three Powers themselves in the planning and control of Berlin contingency operations, as contained in document CTS 62-9, together with the additional explanations and comments which have been furnished by the spokesman of the Three Powers".

"Finally, I think that no reservations were expressed to the suggestion contained in paragraph 12 of PO/62/641 that the Four-Power paper on the Preferred Sequence of Military Actions should be accepted "as a general framework for the continuing discussion of the overall problem of co-ordinating actions and policies of the Allies in the event of a worsening of the Berlin situation". I should like to remind the Council that they have agreed to the desire expressed by a number of Permanent Representatives that a day should be set aside in the near future for the consideration of political contingency plans which should be recorded as forming a catalogue as in the case of the military plans. Perhaps, when we have dealt with the three points mentioned above, we may enquire from the Four Powers when it would be convenient for this further consideration of political contingency plans to take place.

"In conclusion, I should like to ask the Council whether they are prepared:

- (a) to agree on the text of the draft resolution, which is before their eyes;
- (b) to take note of the tripartite paper in the terms that I have expressed;
- (c) to accept the Preferred Sequence paper again in the terms which I have outlined."

2. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he could agree to the draft Council decision on the military contingency plans. At the same time, he was instructed to say that the Canadian Government was concerned at the lack of information given to the NATO Council by the tripartite powers on parallel political contingency planning. In agreeing to the approval of the BERCON/MARCON plans in principle and for planning purposes, the Canadian Government assumed that in future there would be continuous consultation in the Council on a parallel catalogue of political plans. Indeed it hoped that agreement on the catalogue of plans in the terms of the draft decision would clear the way for an early discussion of the urgent and critical diplomatic problems which concerned the Alliance and which should be the object of continuing consultation in the Council.

3. He was also authorised to withdraw the Canadian reservation on the three draft decisions on economic countermeasures set out in PO/62/260, as amended by PO/62/436 during the Council's discussion of this subject on 24th October. Canadian acceptance of these decisions was based on the understanding, which he thought common to all delegations, that final decisions would be taken by governments at the time of any crisis, and that in the meantime, no publicity would be given to NATO examination of these problems - an understanding which applied both to economic countermeasures and military planning.

4. With other speakers, he thanked the Chairman and the Belgian Representative for their help in working out the draft decision before the Council.

5. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he also could approve the draft decision. He noted that the statement by the Chairman that the Council would study the question of alerts at a later date covered the reservation which he had made at the Council meeting of 10th October.

6. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE recalled that his authorities had a different concept of how the Council should approach the question of approving contingency plans, and that they thought the Council should approve the planning activity rather than the specific content of the plans. If the Council

were to be asked to approve particular plans, some of them would have to be examined further, both because of their legal implications and because of their relation to nuclear decisions taken by the Alliance at earlier stages. The critical appraisal by the military authorities should also be taken into consideration. For example, the Council should seriously consider whether it wished to include in a catalogue of approved plans a plan such as MARCON III, which the military authorities considered to provide no military advantages, while incurring a considerable risk of war. He thought that before approving the catalogue the Council should have deliberated whether this was the way in which the Alliance could envisage being involved in war. Further, there were certain measures which were conspicuously absent from the catalogue; though it could be argued that this was compensated for by the fact that the application of any measure was non-automatic. His authorities wished that planning should continue, and could, therefore, accept the draft decision before the Council. He would, however, make three points:

- (i) his government continued to regard the selective use of nuclear weapons as to be envisaged only as a very last warning before the widespread use of nuclear weapons;
- (ii) for all contingency planning, whether military, political or economic, only measures should be envisaged which were as directly related as possible to the question of access to Berlin, in order that the Soviets would not misunderstand Western intentions;
- (iii) he hoped that diplomatic solutions would now be sought energetically.

7. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE was without instructions, but thought that he could probably approve the proposals by the Chairman.

8. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that he could approve the draft decision in the light of the statement by the Chairman. He could also accept the three-power paper, and noted that there was no question of automaticity. Finally, he could note the "preferred sequence" paper as a general framework for continuing discussion.

9. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE was without instructions.

10. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that he could accept the proposals by the Chairman with the following comments for the record:

- (i) as regards the Draft Decision (3) now before the Council, his government understood that the reference to "any significant amendments" implied that it would be for the Council to determine which amendments were to be considered significant;

- (ii) he welcomed the clarifications given in subsequent documents to the Three-Power paper. He had approved this paper earlier, and could confirm his approval in the light of the statement by the Chairman;
- (iii) he could accept the "preferred sequence" paper, but was instructed to say that while his government found it a suitable basis for further planning, it considered that plans for non-military measures, in particular political and economic measures, were lagging behind. His government expected that the Four Powers would submit their views in the very near future on political and economic plans, which were to be seen as forming a whole together with the military plans.

11. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that he was instructed to indicate his government's approval of the Draft Decision before the Council. He considered it so flexible that it covered to a great extent the observations made at this meeting.

12. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE asked that it be put on record that the Standing Group Representative had stated on 23rd October with regard to paragraph 8 of the naval plans, that agreement to these plans by the Council would not constitute agreement in advance that such authority would necessarily be given to the major NATO Commanders simultaneously with a political decision to order execution of a naval action which involved a high risk of reprisal.

13. The CHAIRMAN confirmed that it was understood that the Council agreement would be reached in the light of the statement by the Standing Group Representative recorded in PO/62/680.

14. The COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of the Standing Group appraisal of the Berlin contingency plans proposed by the Major NATO Commanders and agreed that these were responsive to the instructions to the NATO military authorities conveyed in Council Resolution C-M(61)104;
- (2) approved in principle and for planning purposes the Major NATO Commanders' plans in the BERCON and MARCON series, on the basis that these represent a catalogue of plans for possible action by NATO forces in the event that the efforts of the Three Powers to maintain access to Berlin in accordance with the LIVE OAK plans are unsuccessful - the selection and execution of any one of these plans being subject to a prior political decision by member governments at the time;

- (3) agreed that, should this catalogue of plans require revision or amplification in the light of changing circumstances, any significant amendments should be submitted to the Council by the NATO military authorities for approval on the same basis as the present catalogue;
- (4) noted the tripartite paper (CTS 62/9) in the terms expressed by the Chairman;
- (5) accepted the "preferred Sequence" paper (PO/62/593) also in the terms outlined by the Chairman.