

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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NATO SECRET
SUMMARY RECORD
C-R(61)56

Summary record of a meeting of the Council
held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, XVIe.,
on Tuesday, 31st October, 1961 at 3.30 p.m.

PRESENT

Chairman: Mr. D. U. Stikker

<u>BELGIUM</u>	<u>GREECE</u>	<u>NORWAY</u>
Mr. A. de Staercke	Mr. M. Melas	Mr. J. Boyesen
<u>CANADA</u>	<u>ICELAND</u>	<u>PORTUGAL</u>
Mr. J. Léger	Mr. H. Andersen	Mr. Vasco da Cunha
<u>DENMARK</u>	<u>ITALY</u>	<u>TURKEY</u>
Dr. E. Schram-Nielsen	Mr. C. Orlandi Contucci	Mr. Nuri Birgi
<u>FRANCE</u>	<u>LUXEMBOURG</u>	<u>UNITED KINGDOM</u>
Mr. J. D. Jurgensen	Mr. P. Reuter	Sir Paul Mason
<u>GERMANY</u>	<u>NETHERLANDS</u>	<u>UNITED STATES</u>
Dr. G. von Walther	Mr. H. N. Boon	Mr. T.K. Finletter

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Deputy Secretary General:	Mr. A. Casardi
Deputy Secretary General - Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance:	Mr. F. D. Gregh
Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs:	Mr. R. W. J. Hooper
Assistant Secretary General for Production, Logistics and Infrastructure:	Mr. Johnson Garrett
Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs:	Dr. W. A. Nierenberg
Executive Secretary:	The Lord Coleridge

ALSO PRESENT

Standing Group Representative: Maj. Gen. R. H. Barry

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I. END-1966 MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

Reference: C-R(61)54, Item I

Document: PO/61/813

1. At the request of the Chairman the UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE made for the record the following statement on the policy of his government.

2. From the discussions which had already taken place on the end-1966 requirements he had gained the impression that there was some misunderstanding regarding United States policy. He had accordingly asked his authorities for a restatement of this policy, and was not authorised to make the following reply to the apprehensions expressed by a number of Permanent Representatives.

3. His government was ready to approve the end-1966 requirements in the form set out in PO/61/813; and to withdraw the amendment it had proposed. He had said earlier, before withdrawing this amendment, and he now repeated, that in approving these requirements the Council would be approving the very great nuclear capacity of which Permanent Representatives were aware. The Council knew the nature and extent of the nuclear battlefield weapons, extended battlefield weapons and even, to a certain degree, the weapons beyond this category which constituted this huge nuclear power. In this connection he thought it would be useful for the Council to divide nuclear weapons into three categories:

- (i) close-range, or battlefield weapons;
- (ii) deeper-range, or extended battlefield weapons;
- (iii) weapons which went beyond this category and might be defined as "mixed target" weapons, i.e. capable of engaging targets which
 - (a) directly affected the battle for Europe; and
 - (b) represented fundamental power of the enemy, and as such would be dealt with by the strategic air forces.

Categories (i) and (ii) were dealt with in the end-1966 requirements. Category (iii) was also dealt with in part, since NATO planning was obviously concerned with manned aircraft of certain types and certain missiles. Here the only question was whether land-based missiles of the third category were appropriate.

He emphasised that his government's present study was concerned with the kind of MRBM's desirable; there was no feeling against MRBM's as such, the question being whether they should be land-based or not. He further pointed out that the Council had taken no decision on this subject. He recalled that his government intended to commit to NATO 5 Polaris submarines, and more as they became available. It was therefore to be noted that his government placed considerable emphasis on nuclear power.

4. Mr. Kennedy, in his Ottawa speech of 17th May, had indicated that he was ready to consider European proposals for a NATO seaborne missile force which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, and that the NATO European allies should now come forward with such proposals. The United States government now repeated this suggestion; the Council should study the possibility of establishing such a force, and the European allies should now make suggestions as to how this force might be constituted. He would be glad to discuss the matter informally with one or more Permanent Representatives, and invited the Council to accept this firm invitation by his government for an initiative from the European countries.

5. He could further state authoritatively that, pending the results of the United States continuing study of the MRBM requirement, NATO could be confident that weapons deployed outside Allied Command Europe would be available and capable of effective nuclear defence against Soviet attack on Europe. Strategic Air Command forces in the United States and abroad, and the increasing number of ICBMs and Polaris submarines were maintained for this purpose as well as to strike at targets deep in the Soviet Zone.

6. It was in recognition of the inseparability of the defence of Europe and North America that the United States intended to commit an initial five Polaris submarines to NATO and more as they became available for deployment in the NATO command area.

7. Mr. Kennedy had said in Ottawa:

"Both of these measures - improved conventional forces and increased nuclear forces - are put forward in recognition of the fact that the defence of Europe and the defence of North America are indivisible; (and) in the hope that no aggressor will mistake our determination to respond instantly with whatever force is appropriate."

From this the Council would see that there was no change in the policy of the United States government.

8. The CHAIRMAN noted that the Council would wish to give careful study to this statement which raised a number of very important issues.

9. The CHAIRMAN then circulated the following amendment to paragraph 3(b) of the draft resolution PO/61/813:

"(b) to note that, although the proposals of the NATO Commanders for MRBMs and SSN(B)s have not progressed far enough for decision at this time, thus requiring the Military Committee to defer action on this matter, this subject will be considered by the Council at an early date."

10. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he could accept this amendment.

11. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that the Federal Republic, despite considerable concern, was now prepared to approve the draft resolution, with the amendment circulated by the Chairman. His authorities had however instructed him to reiterate in this connection two points they considered to be of major importance:

- (i) that the principle of balance between nuclear and non-nuclear armament would continue to be the precondition for all practical decisions to be taken;
- (ii) that a plan for strengthening the nuclear capability of NATO by the use of MRBMs would have to be submitted at a very early date, since otherwise all work and planning might be devoid of a realistic basis.

12. The CHAIRMAN said that he hoped the decision now reached would enable the United States Authorities to forward comments on the end-1966 requirements for action by the NATO Military Authorities.

13. The COUNCIL:

adopted the draft resolution on the end-1966 military requirements contained in PO/61/813 and as amended above, and agreed that this resolution be forwarded to the NATO military authorities (subsequently circulated as C-M(61)102).

II. FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON LOGISTICS IN PEACE AND WAR

References: C-M(60)47
C-M(60)117(Final)
C-R(61)1
C-R(61)55, Item IV

Documents: C-M(61)93
MC 41/1

14. The CHAIRMAN invited the Council to deal first with document C-M(61)93, which covered the question of training facilities and also referred to certain logistic problems. He suggested that at the present stage the Council should take the action recommended in paragraph 2 of C-M(61)93.

15. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said he could approve both the documents before the Council. With particular reference to MC 41/1, he made the following statement. The United States authorities were prepared to approve MC 41/1, although in their view this document might well have recognised the possibility that NATO could play a greater role in seeking a solution of this difficult problem. In concurring in MC 41/1, he asked that the record clearly show that the United States did not interpret MC 41/1 permanently to foreclose future consideration of NATO control and allocation of use of land training areas in Central Europe, nor did the United States consider that this document foreclosed future consideration of a constructive rôle for NATO in respect to NATO training area problems in general. He earnestly hoped and expected that every effort would be made by the nations to find suitable training areas for NATO forces, and he thought that NATO as an organization should assist in every way it could to overcome the detailed problems discussed in the report of the Working Group (C-M(61)93).

16. He might wish at a future time to make specific suggestions on how NATO could play a more direct part in solving this problem. At present he suggested that the Council ask the Military Authorities to continue to study the rôle NATO as an organization might play in helping to solve training area problems.

17. The United States had consistently advocated greater integration of NATO defence efforts in a number of broad areas. He welcomed the progress made to date, for example, on integrating logistics for advanced weapons, and his authorities hoped that further progress could be made in this field. Indeed it was essential that more, not less progress be made, not only in respect to training, but other logistic problems.

18. He would like at this time to reiterate what he had said last April when the United States presented its views on NATO strategy and defence planning. At that time he had said that the Council, working closely with the NATO Military Authorities, should take full account of the possibilities for co-ordinated NATO research, development and production of improved weapons and equipment for conventional forces and for integration of logistics and training facilities.

19. President Kennedy had publicly stated the United States position when speaking at Ottawa on 17th May he said:

"The time has come for all members of the NATO community to increase further and integrate their respective forces in the NATO command area, co-ordinating and sharing in research, development, production, storage, defence, command and training at all levels of armament."

20. The CHAIRMAN, while agreeing with the proposal by the United States Representative for a study of the role NATO might play in this matter, pointed out that since the date on which MC 41/1 had been issued some progress had been achieved in NATO, and a better understanding reached of the actual situation. The problem was a difficult one for the military authorities; and it was difficult for the International Staff to produce changes in the situation, since changes depended on the willingness of governments to make available training areas. In his view the Working Group had made more progress than might have been expected.

21. The STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE, commenting on the proposal by the United States Representative, thought that the NATO military authorities would not object to being invited to continue study of this question, bearing in mind the points made by the United States Representative. However, he pointed out that the military authorities could make no more progress than governments were willing to allow them to make.

22. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE asked whether it was the intention, as suggested by the German Representative at the last meeting, to put the question of the integration of logistics on the agenda of the Ministerial Meeting.

23. Mr. GREGH (Deputy Secretary General/Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance) said that he did not think that it would be useful at this stage to put the question on the agenda for discussion by Ministers. The study was proceeding on the right lines, but Ministers could do no more than note this fact. He recalled that the problem of integration of logistics

was not a new one. The memorandum by the Federal Republic (C-M(60)24) had given it new impetus, as had the conclusions reached by the Defence Ministers in April 1960 and recorded in C-M(60)33. At the request of the Defence Ministers the NATO military authorities had studied the memorandum by the Federal Republic and had in particular identified the following problems for further study:

- (i) Training area problems (dealt with in MC 41/1);
- (ii) the integration of logistics support for advanced weapons (MC 86/2(Revised); the Armaments Committee would report to the Council on this subject;
- (iii) widening the delegation of logistic authority to the NATO Commanders in wartime;
- (iv) stockpile and storage requirements;
- (v) the establishment of integrated logistic centres and integrated depot infrastructure in central Europe.

24. A conference had been held at SHAPE on 8th June which was now being followed by a series of regional conferences between SACEUR and his major subordinate Commanders. It seemed that it would be some months before the NATO military authorities would be in a position to make specific recommendations.

25. He emphasised that it would not be enough for the Council to note the recommendations by the military authorities; the Council must also discuss the political, financial, economic and production aspects. This discussion should be well prepared by the Working Group, and the preparation itself would take some time.

26. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE thought that a discussion by Ministers in December might accelerate progress.

27. The CHAIRMAN suggested that he should study with the NATO military authorities whether it would be useful to make a progress report to Ministers.

28. The STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE explained the present state of the study by the NATO military authorities of the integration of logistics. Work had begun after MC 86/1 had been approved by the Council in December 1960. It had then become apparent that worthwhile progress could not be achieved without a fundamental and far-reaching review of the logistics system in NATO, beginning with the logistic responsibilities of the NATO Commanders. A conference of all interested parties had

taken place at SHAPE in June, as a result of which a paper for consideration by the Council was now in the course of preparation by the Military Committee. It was the intention that, if not cleared previously by the Military Committee in Permanent Session, this paper should be on the agenda of the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff session in December. It would therefore hardly be available for consideration at the Ministerial meeting. In the meantime, and in anticipation of approval being given to the conclusions of the study referred to above, SACEUR was holding a series of regional conferences with his major Commanders which it was hoped would result in specific recommendations on the remaining outstanding subjects.

29. The COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of the conclusions and approved the recommendations in paragraphs 20 and 21 of C-M(61)93;
- (2) urged the NATO military authorities to forward as soon as possible the outstanding studies referred to in paragraph 3 of C-M(61)93;
- (3) instructed the Working Group to continue its examination of the problems of logistics in peace and war in accordance with its terms of reference;
- (4) took note of document MC 41/1;
- (5) urged national authorities to continue to give consideration to the recommendations in paragraph 4 of MC 41/1;
- (6) invited the military authorities to keep the matter under study with a view to suggesting what further role NATO might play in providing training areas.

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III. POSSIBLE ECONOMIC COUNTERMEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN THE
FACE OF THE BERLIN CRISIS

References: C-M(61)82
C-M(61)94
RDC/61/382
C-M(61)97

(a) Implementation of the three special measures
(Civil Aviation)

Document: RDC/61/399

30. The CHAIRMAN said that he had now been informed that the Norwegian Delegation was able to approve the draft decision contained in RDC/61/399. He invited the views of the Canadian and Danish Representatives.

31. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that the principal view of his authorities was that a cancellation of the air connections with the Eastern bloc countries would be a step of so serious a nature that it ought only to be considered under circumstances similar to those calling for a total embargo, about the effectiveness of which his authorities had considerable doubts. The Council would appreciate that the consequences of implementing such countermeasures in the field of civil aviation could be much more serious for a country like Denmark, which was a neighbour to, and had air traffic connections with the Eastern bloc, than for countries situated geographically far from the Eastern bloc. In the first place, his authorities considered that such an isolated step would have no great effect, in the second place, it might even tend to aggravate the situation, in the long run entailing considerable damage to Western aviation policy. In the third place, he drew attention to the legal aspects of the matter. The document RDC/61/399 envisaged a situation which could not be characterised as the last hour before the possible outbreak of an armed conflict. Consequently, world opinion was still a factor to which NATO must pay attention; the violation of bilateral or multilateral agreements on air traffic without proper justification might make a very bad impression. Both for reasons of principle and in its own interest the West must adhere to the established rule "pacta sunt servanda".

32. In the fourth place, a measure of this kind would create special difficulties for Denmark, as the Scandinavian Airline System was a joint Danish, Norwegian and Swedish enterprise.

33. In recognition, however, of the importance of solidarity within the Alliance, his government was, in spite of its hesitations, ready to participate in planning, but on the understanding that if and when the implementation of the three measures was discussed in the Council, Denmark, like other member countries, retained the right to evaluate the situation, and if the occasion should arise, to enter into consultation with Sweden.

34. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities had now considered the three proposed measures in the field of civil aviation in the course of a general review of the whole question of economic countermeasures. Their decision was that the Canadian government should make no commitment to participate in economic countermeasures in respect of the Berlin situation until access to Berlin was actually denied. This decision included any advance commitments in respect of the denial of air traffic rights to aircraft from Soviet bloc countries.

35. He was instructed to explain that this decision applied not only to the question of the six basic issues affecting a total blockade, but also to the proposed partial economic countermeasures and to the proposed response to the interdiction

of NATO air traffic. He had been further instructed to explain that the Canadian Cabinet was not prepared to commit the government in advance on any of these questions, and that the ultimate decision as far as Canada was concerned must be based on the circumstances prevailing when access to Berlin was denied. He must, therefore, reserve the position of his government on the draft decision, and on any similar decisions which might be placed before the Council in the future.

36. He thought it was clear from the wording of the decision as it now stood that the other member governments were likely to adopt a position which in practice it would be difficult to distinguish from the Canadian position, except for the adherence to a formal document. It seemed to him from the wording of the decision and from the views expressed in the Council discussions, that member governments wished to preserve the greatest possible measure of flexibility to the decisions which would have to be taken in the light of the circumstances at the time of a crisis.

37. At the same time, while reserving their position, he felt confident that the Canadian authorities shared the view that economic countermeasures could conceivably constitute one element of an appropriate and effective response to a Soviet challenge, depending of course on the circumstances. He would therefore ask them to continue to extend a full measure of co-operation to their partners in the Alliance on a practical basis in the further study of the implications of economic countermeasures within NATO.

38. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE confirmed his government's approval of the draft decision in RDC/61/399, but said that he thought the considerations expressed by the Canadian Representative were valid for all governments.

39. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, replying to the comments by the Canadian and Danish Representatives, pointed out that no government was now being asked to commit itself in advance, and all governments were reserving the right to make a political decision at the time in the light of circumstances.

40. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that he was not reserving the position of his government as regards the decision in RDC/61/399, which his government approved in the light of the statement he had made above; he had only expressed doubts as to the expediency of these measures. It would be necessary to enter into consultation with Sweden because of the trilateral contract under which the Scandinavian Airline System operated.

41. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that account must be taken of circumstances in adhering to the rule "pacta sunt servanda". The West would have to take action if there were Soviet interference with air traffic with Berlin. He thought that it was out of the question that in an Alliance such as NATO any member country should reserve the right to consult with a neutral country in the serious circumstances here envisaged. He agreed with the United States Representative that no country was being now asked to take an advance commitment. The Council was now merely deciding to meet in the event of interference, in order to decide what action to take.

42. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that the fact that Denmark and Norway would have to enter into consultation with Sweden in the circumstances envisaged was not a fact which could be debated. It would be inconceivable for these countries to close their airports without previously warning Sweden thereof. It might very well be that consultation with Sweden might result in failure to reach agreement, but Denmark and Norway must reserve the right to enter into such consultation.

43. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that if there was now unanimity in the Council on the draft decision except for Canada he would try to convince his authorities to accept this text.

44. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE emphasised that the situation in Berlin was now more tense and that in the immediate future there might well be partial interference with air traffic. He had been asked to bring up this matter in order that planning might proceed and in order to put the Council in a position to take a political decision in the future. He thought that there was no basic disagreement; all governments reserved the political decision and recognised that in the light of circumstances their individual assessments of the situation might vary. He urged the Council not to postpone a decision any longer. The object of the present exercise was to help the Council to function effectively in a special situation; the exercise was a challenge to the Council to take a decision now.

45. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that while the United States Representative argued that a political decision was not necessary now, in his view two political decisions were involved, one to be taken later in the event of interference, and the other to be taken now, i.e. decision (1) of RDC/61/399. He agreed to obtain further instructions and to discuss this question urgently with the International Staff.

46. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he agreed with the reasoning put forward by the United States Representative. However, he pointed out that the text of the decision glossed over a number of very grave problems to which the Council had not

given any consideration. Among the economic countermeasures envisaged in another field were controls of shipping which, for a maritime country like Norway, represented a most radical step in peacetime. While his authorities had agreed to plan such countermeasures they emphasised that these were steps of great significance to take in peacetime.

47. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said his Government entertained doubts as to the effectiveness of some of the measures envisaged but accepted them out of solidarity with the allies.

48. The COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of the statements made in discussion;
- (2) invited the Chairman and the Canadian Representative to discuss this matter further in the hope of finding an early solution which would allow the Canadian Government to associate itself with all other governments in approving the draft resolution contained in RDC/61/399.

(b) Legal aspects of possible economic countermeasures

-Document: C-M(61)99

49. The CHAIRMAN recalled that at its meeting on 4th October the Council had agreed that a group of experts in international law should meet to study the legal aspects of economic countermeasures. The report by this group (C-M(61)99) had now been transmitted to the Council by the Working Group on Economic Countermeasures. The Council would note that the legal experts generally agreed that in the event of a blockage of military and civilian access, air or ground, to West Berlin, a total economic embargo by all members of NATO could be justified as legitimate self-defence, individual and collective, both by the Three Powers with special responsibilities in Berlin and by the other NATO powers. The experts also considered that the appropriate response to action by the Soviet Union or the Soviet-occupied zone in interfering with communications to Berlin might be partial economic countermeasures. In this situation, however, while the Three Powers could act according to the classical rules of reprisals, the other member countries could invoke justifications based on a theory which "might not be considered to be an uncontroversial expression of the existing principles of international law" (paragraph 7 of C-M(61)99). This theory would also have to be invoked for the justification of the three special countermeasures relating to civil aviation where, in addition, particular difficulties would

arise for the Turkish Government as a result of the Montreux Convention and for Denmark and Norway as regards the Scandinavian Airlines System.

50. The experts had also agreed that economic counter-measures would not in themselves involve any infringement of the United Nations Charter and that member countries were not under any legal obligation to refer to the Security Council before taking such measures.

51. He expressed his appreciation of the expeditious and useful work of Professor Riphagen, the Chairman of the legal group, and his colleagues; and suggested that the Council take note of the report.

52. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he thought that the report was a most disappointing one. The particular problem under study had been the legal questions arising in connection with international agreements, both bilateral and multilateral. He thought that the Group had taken their task to be that of thinking up justifications for the violation of such agreements, whereas what had been intended was a study of the legal problems from an objective point of view. On this subject the document provided little enlightenment. The Council was well aware that Soviet policy was such that member governments might well be forced to break certain international agreements, but the group should have indicated objectively whether and in what circumstances this would constitute a violation of international law.

53. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE expressed the opinion that the report was a precise, competent and satisfactory one.

54. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE thought that the report gave a competent assessment of the legal position and of the justifications which member countries could give if they were forced to break certain agreements.

55. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities much appreciated the work of the Group, which had resulted in a satisfactory conclusion.

56. The CHAIRMAN thought that, given the time available, the experts had carried out the task assigned to them and provided a fair assessment of the situation.

57. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE, supporting this view, said that it seemed clear from the report that the ultimate decisions would have to be justified on grounds which were more political than legal. This was important. He thought that the political justification in the circumstances might be self-evident, and that legal arguments would be of much less importance.

58. The COUNCIL:

took note of the report by the Working Group on Economic Countermeasures on the Legal Aspects of Possible Economic Countermeasures (C-M(61)99).

(c) Study of document PO/61/782 transmitted by the United States Delegation

Document: C-M(61)100

59. The CHAIRMAN said that the Working Group on Economic Countermeasures had examined the "Suggestions on economic countermeasures for consideration by member governments of the Council" transmitted by the United States Delegation and circulated in PO/61/782. This examination had been based on an International Staff analysis which was attached to C-M(61)100 as a reference document.

60. The Working Group had agreed that among the principal questions facing NATO following the elaboration of the new document were two of a political nature which the Council should examine. He invited the views of the Council on the first two questions of Part IV of C-M(61)100, which were:

- (1) Are the countries of the Alliance in agreement on the principle of application of partial countermeasures for certain particular situations and as a response to hostile moves by the Soviet bloc (harassments, interference)?
- (2) Do the countries of the Alliance possess the legal and administrative powers to apply those countermeasures envisaged which are not included in the list covering countermeasures foreseen in the case of a total embargo, and, if need be, are they ready to take the necessary action in order to obtain these powers?

61. The BELGIAN, FRENCH, GERMAN, ICELANDIC, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS, NORWEGIAN, UNITED KINGDOM and UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES indicated that their governments could reply in the affirmative to the first question.

62. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE made a proposal that, in the early stages of the application of economic countermeasures, action should be taken first against East Germany. He undertook to circulate the text of the proposal after the meeting.

63. The GREEK and TURKISH REPRESENTATIVES said that they could reply in the affirmative to question (1) provided that before a Council decision was taken to apply these measures an equitable system of compensation would have been worked out for those member countries whose economy would suffer disproportionately from the measures.

64. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his government could reluctantly reply in the affirmative on the assumption that the application of the measures would be gradual, progressive and related to the circumstances.

65. It was re-affirmed in discussion that the application of the measures would be the subject of a Council decision at the time.

66. The BELGIAN, LUXEMBOURG and NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVES said that their governments' affirmative reply to question (1), and also to question (2), was intended to allow planning to proceed in the Working Group.

67. In answer to question (2) the UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities had taken or were taking the necessary powers to bring these measures into effect if required.

68. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that in an extreme emergency his government would dispose of sweeping powers and that therefore no problem would arise in the case of a complete embargo. The application of partial measures would depend on circumstances, and such measures should be graduated.

69. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that he could reply in the affirmative to the second question in those cases where there would be no disavowal of international obligations.

70. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that after a preliminary study by his authorities it appeared that under existing legislation the powers already exist to apply measures (n) and (q) in Annex II.

71. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities were now preparing the necessary legislation but would wait until a crisis was imminent before presenting it to Parliament.

72. The BELGIAN, FRENCH, ICELANDIC, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS, TURKISH and UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES replied in the affirmative to question (2).

73. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE, also replying in the affirmative, said that his authorities were studying further the question of controls on shipping and air traffic. He agreed with other speakers that the main purpose of the present discussion was to enable planning to proceed in the Working Group.

74. The CHAIRMAN suggested that countries should reply in writing to the Working Group before 14th November to questions (3) to (6) of Part IV of C-M(61)100, and that the Working Group should report at the latest by 25th November.

75. The COUNCIL:

- (1) took note of the statements made;
- (2) agreed to invite governments to reply in writing to the Working Group to questions (3) to (6) of Part IV of C-M(61)100 before 14th November, and that the Working Group should report at the latest by 25th November.

(d) The Legal and Administrative Prerequisites to the Implementation of Economic Countermeasures

Document: C-M(61)82

76. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his government was now in a position to implement at short notice the measures listed under (a) to (i) in Annex III to C-M(61)82, and that it was prepared to make use of them should the political situation require it in the interest of the Alliance.

77. The COUNCIL:

took note of the above statement.

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IV. EXERCISE "LONG THRUST TWO"

Document: PO/61/821

78. The CHAIRMAN said that a discussion would take place in the Council 10 to 14 days before the date, as yet undecided, for which the exercise was planned.

79. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statement by the Chairman.

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

V. DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING

80. Wednesday, 8th November, 1961 at 10.15 a.m. (plenary session).

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, XVIe.

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