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CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD ✓
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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EXEMPLAIRE N° 361
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NATO SECRET
SUMMARY RECORD
C-R(61)62

Summary Record of a meeting of the Council, held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, XVIe., on Thursday, 7th December, 1961, at 11.30 a.m.

PRESENT

Chairman: Mr. D.U. Stikker

BELGIUM	GREECE	NORWAY
Mr. A. de Staercke	Mr. M. Melas	Mr. J. Boyesen
CANADA	ICELAND	PORTUGAL
Mr. J. Léger	Mr. H. Andersen	Mr. Vasco da Cunha
DENMARK	ITALY	TURKEY
Dr. E. Schram-Nielsen	Mr. A. Alessandrini	Mr. Nuri Birgi
FRANCE	LUXEMBOURG	UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. P. de Leusse	Mr. P. Reuter	Sir Paul Mason
GERMANY	NETHERLANDS	UNITED STATES
Dr. G. von Walther	Mr. H.N. Boon	Mr. T.K. Finletter

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Deputy Secretary General:	Mr. A. Casardi
Deputy Secretary General - Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance:	Mr. F.D. Gregh
Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs:	Mr. R.W.J. Hooper
Executive Secretary:	The Lord Coleridge

ALSO PRESENT

Standing Group Representative:	General de Brigade R. Boisseau

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TOTAL ECONOMIC EMBARGO AGAINST THE SOVIET BLOC

Documents: Draft decision (see Annex to the present record)
RDC/61/399
CM(61)94

1. The CHAIRMAN noted that discussions on economic countermeasures had been continuing for some time. Though progress had been made on technical details it had not been possible so far for the Council to discuss basic principles, which had been the subject of talks between delegations. It had become evident that it was necessary to have a clear view on one problem, that of automaticity. He circulated a draft decision (see Annex to the present record) for submission to governments. He suggested that if agreement could be reached on this text, it should be borne in mind that a similar procedure should apply to the problem of civil aviation. He also suggested that the question of the "mitigation" of the adverse effects of economic countermeasures on the economies of member countries should be studied after he had further examined it with delegations.

2. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, with all other speakers, congratulated the Chairman on his personal role in providing a solution to this problem. He was empowered to accept this decision now, on two conditions. Firstly, the decision on a total economic embargo should be approved at the same time as the draft decision on the implementation of the three specific measures (civil aviation) - vide RDC/61/399. A feature of both these texts was that the principle of automaticity adopted on 6th August by the four Foreign Ministers had been abandoned, in favour of a political decision at the time. The decision would be taken by governments at the time, but he assumed that the spirit of the resolution was that in the event of a blockage of the kind described, a total economic embargo would be an appropriate response. Since for the United States the adoption of this decision meant going back on its strongly-expressed position of August, he must insist that both texts be approved at the same time.

3. The second condition was that all governments would take all the necessary preliminary steps to be in a position to carry out the decision to apply a total economic embargo, if that decision was taken.

4. He agreed that the Council should defer discussion on burden-sharing. He thought that a solution of this problem could be worked out, and that the countries affected should act on this assumption. Emphasising that the problem of a total

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economic embargo was a troublesome one which had lingered on far too long, he thought that it was important that all member countries should take a rapid favourable decision on the two draft decisions, before the Ministerial Meeting if possible.

5. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said he thought his government would welcome the new draft decision and the very helpful spirit of compromise shown by the United States. He recalled that he had for some time been in a position to accept the decision contained in RDC/61/399. It was clear that the two exercises should work in perfect harmony with each other. As regards ability to implement specific measures, his authorities were pressing ahead and he could say that they were already in a high state of preparedness. He hoped, with the United States Representative, that an agreement could be reached on the two draft decisions before the Ministerial Meeting.

6. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said that his government could accept the new draft decision, though regretfully, since this represented a considerable withdrawal from the decision adopted on 6th August. He hoped that all member governments would approve the two texts at the same time, and would continue to take the necessary steps to be in a position to implement a decision on a total economic embargo.

7. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that the new draft was not very satisfactory to his delegation, but he could approve it with a view to its approval by the Council before the Ministerial Meeting. He also hoped that it would be backed up by adequate readiness measures.

8. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that he would transmit the draft urgently to his government, but he noted that there was no reference in it to the question of sharing the sacrifices involved. He recalled that the agreement of his government depended on the solidarity of the Alliance in this field; the necessity of this solidarity was in fact already recognised.

9. The ICELANDIC REPRESENTATIVE thought that his government's acceptance of the draft would be on the understanding that agreement would be reached on the principles laid down in C-M(61)114. If this understanding was confirmed, it was possible that he might be able to approve the text before the Ministerial Meeting.

10. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE said that the attitude of his government, like that of the Greek Government, would depend on the position adopted by the Council on burden-sharing. On the subject of air communications he recalled his previous

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reservation regarding the Montreux Convention. He asked whether the last sentence of the draft decision on a total embargo meant an "all or nothing" decision, i.e. would the Council decide on a total economic embargo or no embargo at all, or alternatively on graduated measures?

11. The CHAIRMAN, answering this last question, pointed out that the draft decision contained three elements. Firstly, the Council was invited to decide that under certain circumstances a total economic embargo would be an appropriate response. Secondly, a moral obligation would then be created to take action in such circumstances. Thirdly, in the event that such circumstances arose, the Council should then decide whether the total economic embargo should be applied. He could not believe that if circumstances arose which would in fact be bordering on war, there could be any doubt that this action would be taken as a last resort.

12. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE hoped that agreement could be reached at an early date on this draft decision, and recalled that he had already indicated his government's approval of the decision in RDC/61/399.

13. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he could approve both texts.

14. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities were in agreement with the principles laid down in C-M(61)114, and thought that this document should be studied at the same time as the supplementary report of the Committee of Economic Advisers on means of mitigating the effects of economic countermeasures on certain member countries(1).

15. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE was in a position to approve the draft resolution on a total embargo.

16. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he would recommend that his government approve this draft, on which he hoped a decision could be reached before the Ministerial Meeting. He would inform his government of the United States condition linking this text to that of RDC/61/399.

17. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE recalled that he had already stated the views of his government. His government could accept the new draft in principle on the understanding, firstly, that a total economic embargo would be imposed only in a

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(1) Subsequently circulated as C-M(61)150.

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serious situation which would meet the criteria governing the application of Norwegian emergency legislation. It was his understanding that the explanations given by the United States Representative in earlier discussions of the Council had made this clear. The second proviso was that there would be no automaticity; the new draft covered this point. He could also approve the decision in RDC/61/399.

18. The LUXEMBOURG and NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVES said they thought their governments would approve the new draft.

19. In answer to the comments by the Icelandic, Greek and Turkish Representatives, the CHAIRMAN pointed out that the draft decision on a total economic embargo was dependent on the question of burden-sharing. If agreement could be reached on the principles set out in C-M(61)114, the decisions on this draft decision and also on RDC/61/399 would then become final. In reply to questions he said that it was unlikely that a discussion could take place on C-M(61)114 before the Ministerial Meeting. The Supplementary Report by the Committee of Economic Advisers would be submitted to the Council in the next few days.

20. In conclusion, the COUNCIL:

(1) took note of the statements made in discussion;

(2) agreed to obtain instructions on the draft decision annexed to the present record and on the draft decision contained in RDC/61/399(Revised), if possible before the Ministerial Meeting.

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, XVIe.

NATO SECRET
ANNEX to
C-R(61)62

TOTAL ECONOMIC EMBARGO AGAINST THE SOVIET BLOC

Draft Decision

"The Council has decided that in the event military and civilian access, air or ground, to West Berlin is blocked, the immediate imposition of significant countermeasures amounting to a total economic embargo against the Soviet Bloc would be an appropriate response. The NATO countries are planning their concerted participation in such an effort. In the event that blockage appears to be substantially complete, the Council will meet and as appropriate, acting under guidance of governments, will consider whether such an embargo should be put into effect."

5th December, 1961

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