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CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris, XVIe., on Thursday, 13th December, 1962 at 3.15 p.m.

PRESENT

President: The Rt. Hon. Earl of Home

Chairman and Acting Secretary General: Mr. G. Colonna

BELGIUM

H.E. Mr. P.-H. Spaak	Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. P.W. Segers	Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. A. de Staercke	Permanent Representative

CANADA

The Hon. Howard Green	Secretary of State for External Affairs
The Hon. Douglas S. Harkness	Minister of National Defence
H.E. Mr. G. Ignatieff	Permanent Representative

DENMARK

H.E. Mr. Per Haekkerup	Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Victor Gram	Minister of Defence
H.E. Dr. E. Schram-Nielsen	Permanent Representative

FRANCE

H.E. Mr. M. Couve de Murville	Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. P. Messmer	Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. François Seydoux	Permanent Representative

GERMANY

H.E. Dr. Gerhardt Schröder	Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. H.J. von Merkatz	Federal Minister, representing the Federal Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. W.G. Grewe	Permanent Representative

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GREECE

H.E. Mr. Evanghelos Averoff-Tossizza	Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Panayotis Papaligouras	Minister for Economic Co-ordination
H.E. Mr. Aristide Protopapadakis	Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. Christian X. Palamas	Permanent Representative

ICELAND

H.E. Mr. Gudmundur I. Gudmundsson	Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Petur Thorsteinsson	Permanent Representative

ITALY

H.E. Mr. Attilio Piccioni	Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Giulio Andreotti	Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. Adolfo Alessandrini	Permanent Representative

LUXEMBOURG

H.E. Mr. E. Schaus	Vice-President of the Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence
H.E. Mr. Paul Reuter	Permanent Representative

NETHERLANDS

H.E. Mr. J.M.A.H. Luns	Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Dr. H.N. Boon	Permanent Representative

NORWAY

H.E. Mr. Halvard Lange	Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Gudmund Harlem	Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. Jens Boyesen	Permanent Representative

PORTUGAL

H.E. Mr. A. Franco Nogueira	Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. General M. Gomes de Araujo	Minister of Defence
H.E. Mr. V. da Cunha	Permanent Representative

TURKEY

H.E. Mr. Feridun Cemal Erkin	Minister for Foreign Affairs
H.E. Mr. Ilhami Sancar	Minister of Defence
H.E. Dr. Fethi Çelikbaş	Minister of Industry
H.E. Mr. Nuri Birgi	Permanent Representative

UNITED KINGDOM

H.E. Sir Paul Mason	Permanent Representative

UNITED STATES

The Hon. Dean Rusk	Secretary of State
The Hon. Robert S. McNamara	Secretary of Defense
The Hon. Thomas K. Finletter	Permanent Representative

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INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Mr. F.D. Gregh	Deputy Secretary General, Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance
Mr. Johnson Garrett	Assistant Secretary General for Production, Logistics and Infrastructure
Dr. W.P. Allis	Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs
The Lord Coleridge	Executive Secretary

ALSO PRESENT

General C.P. de Cumont	Chairman, Military Committee
General A. Heusinger	Chairman, Military Committee in Permanent Session
General Dean C. Strother	Chairman, Standing Group
Général de Corps d'Armée J.M. Guérin	Standing Group Representative

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I. REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION (Contd.)

1. Mr. SCHAUS (Luxembourg), commenting on the Cuban crisis, said that the repercussions for the Alliance had given rise to several useful conclusions. Notably it was of the greatest satisfaction that complete agreement had been reached among the fifteen governments. Events had also shown that in a sudden crisis, without opportunity for advance consultation, the reaction of the Atlantic powers had been very satisfying. He underlined the importance, however, of full consultation wherever possible in future.

2. The crisis had provided a sharp reminder that no negotiations could be based upon the assumption of good faith on the part of the Soviets; the methods which had been employed by Soviet politicians and diplomats over Cuba had been almost unbelievable. The Alliance had also learned the full effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent in containing Soviet ambitions. He emphasised that the protection afforded by nuclear weapons in Europe continued to play a very important part in the overall defence of the West.

3. He felt that contact should be maintained with the Soviet bloc, since the Cuban crisis had shown that in the face of certain extreme situations the Russians were quite capable of understanding that there were limits beyond which they could not go. The Council in permanent session should be informed at an early date of the elements to be discussed with regard to Berlin and Germany. He urged the four powers to take the initiative in laying before the Council in permanent session the fullest possible information in order to encourage frank and early consultation.

4. The links between the NATO nations were becoming steadily closer, particularly in the sphere of economic co-operation. Although difficulties were inevitable in the future, he was convinced that they would prove surmountable and that the solidarity of the Alliance would continue as a powerful expression of the values and ideals which the NATO nations held in common.

5. Mr. HAEKKERUP (Denmark) said that while the NATO machinery for political consultation had worked well in the past, and even during the Cuban crisis had proved adequate, time would be needed to develop a fully effective system of consultation. The skilful way in which the dramatic developments of the Cuban crisis had been handled had enhanced greatly the prestige of the West in general and of the United States in particular.

6. Concerning Berlin, he underlined the importance to Denmark, by virtue of her geographical situation, of the outcome of events in that city. He confirmed his government's support for the maintenance of the three Western non-negotiable principles, and while insisting on the need to preserve the credibility of

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Western commitments in the event of a threat to Berlin, he felt that the West should never give up hope of reaching a modus vivendi in Berlin through a negotiated settlement.

7. Commenting on Denmark's strategically important location at the approaches to the Baltic, he recalled that the Soviet Government had always focussed attention on Denmark's foreign policy and military alignment with NATO in general and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular. Although the establishment of a unified Baltic Command in December 1961 had provoked a Soviet note to the Danish Government, it had been observed with satisfaction that no similar communication had been received during the past year, notwithstanding the fact that in practice the Baltic Command became operational on 1st July, 1962. He emphasised, however, that the Soviet Union was continuing to follow attentively all Danish-German military activity.

8. The maintenance of peace in the Baltic area was also of great importance to Finland, and it had been noticeable that in the face of the extreme prudence maintained by the Finnish Government, there had been no revival of Soviet initiatives against this country.

9. His Government hoped for an early and successful conclusion to the negotiations currently in progress to expand the Common Market, together with the increasing movement towards European political co-operation. Denmark wished to play her full part in any such political co-operation and was convinced that this would reinforce the bonds linking the NATO nations.

10. Mr. LUNS (Netherlands) said that because of the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba the conditions under which the Council met at the present time were somewhat better than hitherto. The Soviet Union had realised once again the strong bonds of solidarity within the Alliance. The West was in a better position in its search for a solution of East/West problems. If the evolution taking place in certain Satellite countries and the internal difficulties facing the Soviet Union were added to the ideological differences which opposed the USSR to China, it became clear that the Soviet leaders could not face the future with the same confidence as in the past.

11. The question was whether the West should not profit by this favourable turn of events in extending the positive policy of the past few months to other domains pertaining to relations with the USSR. It could be hoped that the Soviet Union was considering a solution to some of the outstanding major problems, such as Berlin, the re-unification of Germany, disarmament and the ban on nuclear tests. Nevertheless, the West should be careful to take an initiative only when there was a real possibility of a practical agreement being reached.

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12. At the present time, Western objectives should remain strictly limited. He considered it dangerous to negotiate over Berlin if the problem were tied to other matters. If questions such as disarmament anddeclarations on non-aggression could be dealt with in the context of the German problem, they must be tied to the re-unification of Germany and not to Berlin. It had sometimes been suggested that the Berlin question should be raised in the United Nations in order to show the world the good intentions of the West. However, he thought that such a procedure should only be looked upon as a last effort on the part of the West to show that no peace-saving endeavour had been overlooked. On the other hand, the possibility of creating an international authority to ensure access to Berlin should not be rejected. Such a solution could be further studied, without prejudicing in any way the well-known, essential interests of the West.

13. He felt that the continuation of informal talks with the USSR would be useful, but it was important that United States contacts with the USSR should be based on prior NATO consultations. Therefore, detailed consultations should be held by the Council before any new departure. Moreover, the Council should plan the political measures to be taken to counteract any Soviet initiative. Ministers should agree that the Berlin political contingency plans should be studied for a longer period ahead than hitherto. Up to now, political plans had not kept pace with military plans. The latter were encouraging, and should lead NATO to prepare contingency plans in other fields where the USSR could create dangerous situations. In this connection, Mr. Rusk had earlier underlined the necessity for improving communications within the Alliance.

14. At the same time, NATO's primary strength lay in military preparedness. The maintenance of the forward strategy was an imperative. In European countries, priority must be given to the strengthening of conventional means of defence within an integrated defence system. This called for even closer political consultation in the future.

15. Mr. GREEN (Canada) said that while the Soviet Union was re-assessing its policies as a result of its forced withdrawal from Cuba and while disagreement over the Chinese aggression against India increased dissensions in the Communist bloc, the West was evaluating the effects on the main East/West issues. He considered that the United States response to the Soviet challenge in Cuba had been timely, decisive and of calculated moderation and, accompanied by a declared readiness to negotiate on other major problems, had been of importance in creating a favourable international reaction. This unexpected response to the discovery of offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba, together with Western and Latin American solidarity, had forced the Soviets to realise that their withdrawal was the only alternative to a major confrontation.

16. Similar Soviet reactions must not necessarily be expected when their more vital interests were affected and their strategic disadvantages decreased. Nevertheless, although it was dangerous to draw parallels between Cuba and Berlin, the firm Western response in Cuba might result in Soviet hesitation to challenge

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vital Western interests in Berlin and elsewhere, and the absence of new Soviet initiatives in Berlin and Soviet caution over a separate peace treaty were already evident.

17. One of the most significant results of the Cuban crisis was the renewed hope of an East/West settlement of other major issues. Moreover, it should be realised that the diplomatic position of the West had been strengthened by the events in Cuba and the West should consider how best to employ this towards obtaining a reduction in tension. It was important for NATO to review urgently the Western position regarding a negotiated settlement in Berlin which would fully protect all vital Western interests. Canada wholeheartedly supported the United States exploratory talks with the Soviet Union to determine whether a satisfactory basis existed for formal negotiations on Berlin, as they had already at least clarified the non-negotiable areas. In spite of the primary need to reach a final settlement in Cuba, he believed that these talks should be resumed as soon as possible.

18. Recent Canadian talks with Mr. Khrushchev did not seem to forecast early Soviet action, but Mr. Khrushchev would be reluctant to alter his objectives in Berlin, even if to reach agreement with the West he might feel compelled to modify his terms. In order to be ready to meet any unilateral Soviet action in Berlin, the Council in Permanent Session should, in addition to Berlin military and economic contingency planning, consider parallel political contingency planning thus enabling NATO governments to determine their relationship with East Germany in the event of the signing of a separate peace treaty or the calling of a Peace Conference. The Council should direct Permanent Representatives to review all the proposals submitted to it in Permanent Session one year previously regarding the broader problem of European security.

19. The Geneva Disarmament Conference remained a most important point of contact with the Soviet Union. Despite Soviet intransigence regarding cessation of nuclear tests and general disarmament, it was essential to explore every possibility of agreement and a treaty to end nuclear testing was crucial to future progress on disarmament. Intermediate steps could form the basis of a comprehensive test ban, such as the interim agreement suggested in the United Nations to provide adequate safeguards against underground testing. Despite Soviet refusal to accept reasonable conditions for verification, the establishment of some form of international scientific commission should be supported, to promote full agreement on the problem of inspection. The West should continue attempts to persuade the Soviet Union to accept realistic proposals on general disarmament and should place increasing emphasis on collateral measures to reduce international tension and facilitate disarmament; such measures merited further examination by the Council in Permanent Session. The Geneva discussions should not be regarded as incompatible with efforts to maintain a high level of defence preparedness in NATO, and successes at Geneva could greatly promote the security of the NATO area.

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20. An important contact with the Soviet bloc was also provided by the United Nations, in which it had been demonstrated that the attitude of non-aligned African and Asian nations was not inflexible nor necessarily inimical to NATO and that Afro-Asian solidarity was largely superficial, except on colonial issues. Although the Soviet Union had in the United Nations criticised some NATO nations regarding colonialism, yet it had itself suffered set-backs at the United Nations on account of its odious form of modern colonialism, which NATO nations should join in attacking and contrasting with Western liberation of 600 million people in dependent territories since 1945. Other recent developments had helped to improve the position of NATO powers in the United Nations, among them the increasing support for the United Nations Secretary General.

21. Considering the Sino-Indian dispute, he emphasised the gravity of the threat to India from China, despite the limited territorial objectives of China, which he believed had been subordinated to the issue of Asian leadership. A mutually acceptable modus vivendi must be achieved which would not impair India's long-term economic development and security. Moreover, it was expedient for India and Pakistan to improve their relations and realise that they were being equally menaced by expansionist China. The United Kingdom and United States Governments were to be congratulated for their recent initiatives in this respect and further assistance could be provided by other NATO governments. Despite her recognition of China's aggressiveness and appreciation of Western help, India could scarcely abandon its policy of non-alignment, which yielded advantages especially with regard to her influence in Africa and Asia.

22. In his view, the international situation gave ground for cautious optimism provided the Alliance continued to apply adequate responses to Soviet pressures.

23. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) felt that the problem of East/West relations should be seen against the background of the important success by the United States over Cuba. He thought he could distinguish two schools of thought: the one favoured by governments anxious to see the West and NATO pursue an active policy, and the other favoured by governments that considered the wisest course to consist in waiting for moves from the Soviet side. He for his part preferred an active policy, the blueprint for which was to be found in President Kennedy's letter of 27th October stating that once the Cuban question was completely and satisfactorily settled nothing but good could come from a widening of the discussions and from a consideration of other problems now pending.

24. Among the reasons which, in his opinion, justified an active policy, was the fact that the other side now seemed to be in a position which should make it amenable to reasonable arguments.

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Generally speaking, he considered that in the last two years the position of the West vis-à-vis the Communist world had markedly improved and that in the conflict between two different conceptions of life it could reasonably be assumed that, barring some terrible accident, the cause of freedom would ultimately triumph. He recalled that at the present time the USSR was having to contend with many difficulties: a serious agricultural crisis which affected the whole of the Communist world, the very heavy burden of a costly nuclear policy and, lastly, the difficult ideological problem raised by the Common Market. In this connection he pointed out that as soon as the "capitalist" world managed to iron out or tone down its contradictions, the contradictions in the Communist world became increasingly apparent, and that the Common Market, whose economic power was steadily growing, had for a certain number of Communist satellites an attraction which could not fail to worry the USSR. To these difficulties must be added the problem of relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China, and, lastly, the realisation by the USSR of the power of the United States. He therefore considered that at a time when the enemy was revealing weak points, an attempt should be made to negotiate with him without waiting for him to recover his balance or for his weakness to cause him to act in an unreasonable manner. He took the view that an active policy was also warranted by all the reports from Moscow on the suggestions which Mr. Khrushchev had put forward in conversations with several Western diplomats. Some of the ideas Mr. Khrushchev had advanced, for example on the question of access routes to Berlin, on Berlin as a free city, on the possibility of transferring the United Nations or part of its activities there, on the presence of certain troops in Berlin, deserved consideration.

25. As regards methods, he thought that the policy of probing which the United States had launched last year was no longer sufficient in itself, and could only constitute a preparatory phase now almost ended. He accordingly suggested that the Council in permanent session should undertake a systematic study of the different proposals which had been made on essential points and that NATO should work out a strategic plan to be introduced when the time came. He re-emphasised his disagreement with the school of thought which was against any initiative. He was afraid that, at a given moment, Mr. Khrushchev would be unable to resist the pressures being exerted on him and that in the end would sign a treaty with East Germany, which, as he (Mr. Spaak) had often pointed out, would create an unfortunate situation which must be avoided. In short, if without yielding on any vital point, the West was able to rid Europe of the threat which lay over it and over the world, and to solve the problems separating it from the Soviets, it would have gained a real advantage. He therefore urged that NATO be ready to act whenever it seemed vital to do so.

26. In conclusion, he commented on the machinery for mutual information and consultation with the Alliance. In his view this machinery had serious defects. He recalled that the problem had

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arisen in 1956 after the Suez crisis and had been discussed in the report of the Three Wise Men. Mr. Rusk's remarks that morning had caused him to go through that report once more. In his opinion the Three had, in 1957, given all the answers to all of Mr. Rusk's questions. He regretted that the Alliance had been unable to find a solution to a problem which had so often been discussed, namely, the distinction between information and consultation. After stressing the advantages of full consultation, he said the basic problem was to establish the geographical limits within which this consultation should take place; they were in fact world-wide. He added that consultation implied a joint responsibility to be accepted both by the consulted and by the consulting partner. He emphasised in conclusion that no country could demand the solidarity of its allies if it had not fully consulted them. He therefore urged that the unanimous agreement on principles should be translated into action.

27. Lord HOME (United Kingdom) noted that while there was no evidence whatever that the recent Communist operation in Cuba and India had been jointly co-ordinated, both these acts of expansion had their source in the doctrine of Wars of Liberation which had been approved by the 1960 Conference of Communist Parties of the World. Unlike China, however, the Soviet Union had qualified this doctrine with the reservation that aggression must stop short of world war, which could no longer be recognised as a legitimate instrument of policy; this theme was given increasing emphasis in the speeches and language used by Mr. Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders.

28. Although the Soviet Union was undergoing a process of change, which must eventually be reflected in its external policy, the evidence of the past few years and months demonstrated that Communism would continue its efforts to deceive the West and exploit its weaknesses, and that the justification for the Atlantic Alliance was as valid as before.

29. After expressing a large measure of agreement with the assessment given by Mr. Rusk and other speakers of the present Soviet mood and of the motivation for Soviet actions before and during the Cuban affair, Lord Home said that the basic reason for Mr. Khrushchev's action in Cuba was undoubtedly the wish to redress the present imbalance of strategic nuclear power without imposing undue strain on his country's economy. Moreover, besides strengthening the Soviet position for a renewed campaign on Berlin during the autumn, success in Cuba would have re-established the Soviet Union as the political and military leader of the Communist International and further intimidated the neutral countries.

30. There were no doubt many reasons for Mr. Khrushchev's serious miscalculation; in all probability he expected that the imminence of nuclear war would encourage a defeatist attitude on the part of certain members of the Alliance, and that action would

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be taken by the United Nations, to which the United States would conform. His miscalculation was nonetheless uncharacteristic and somewhat disturbing, and evidenced that the Soviet Union must in future be made clearly aware of the points on which negotiation was impossible.

31. In the view of the United Kingdom, Mr. Khrushchev's precipitate withdrawal from Cuba was prompted by three major considerations:

- his unwillingness to allow the seizure of the Soviet missiles;
- his recognition that an invasion of Cuba would result in a direct confrontation between Soviet and United States personnel and consequently an imminent danger of war, which was against his doctrine;
- the marginal importance which he attributed to Cuba.

32. Whether or not this analysis was an accurate one, there would surely be some advantage in studying the applicability to other possible crises of the lessons learned as a result of the Cuban affair.

33. After joining other speakers in congratulating the United States on its firm and flexible handling of the Cuban crisis, Lord Home went on to consider whether there was in the Soviet Union a change of mood and policy which might allow the West to achieve a more constructive degree of co-existence with it.

34. His assessment of the present mood in the Soviet Union was that:

- Mr. Khrushchev probably wished for a pause in which to build up the strength of the Soviet Union and, in particular, to give credibility to its deterrent;
- the principal debate in Moscow was whether the Soviet economy was capable of improving the national standard of living while at the same time redressing the present imbalance of strategic nuclear power by the manufacture of sufficient long-range nuclear missiles to cover the United States;
- as appeared from heavy increases in the defence budget of the Soviet Union, by recent discussions with Soviet representatives, and by the speeches of Soviet leaders, no significant initiative on disarmament or on Berlin was to be expected from behind the Iron Curtain in the near future.

35. In all probability, therefore, the West should expect a lull in the Soviet activity, rather than a true détente. Even if this conclusion were inaccurate, the United Kingdom Government was informed that Mr. Khrushchev would not at present greatly welcome a Western initiative, to which he could not respond without appearing to continue his Cuban reversal.

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36. Lord Home said that he shared the reluctance of Mr. Spaak to accept an impasse in East-West relations, and expressed the hope that contacts with the Soviet Union would be maintained and that openings could be contrived which might lead to agreement in specific areas. As a case in point, he suggested that before the Soviets completed their intercontinental ballistic missile programme, the West should pursue with more vigour and flexibility, perhaps to the point of minimum risk, that section of disarmament measures dealing with the matters mentioned in particular by Mr. Green - anti-surprise attack, the test ban, the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, and perhaps a first stage of physical disarmament.

37. The United Kingdom took the view that the Berlin situation could hardly be equated with that of Cuba, which was of only marginal importance to the Soviet Union. Despite an apparent suggestion to the United Kingdom Ambassador in Moscow that allied troops could remain in Berlin without the addition of any netural troops under what he called the "United Nations flag", Mr. Khrushchev had later confirmed his intention to be that the Allied troops should be under the control of the United Nations for a temporary period, after which the Headquarters of the United Nations would be transferred to Berlin.

38. Although such a solution was clearly unacceptable, the United Kingdom favoured the maintenance of contacts with the Soviet Union, in the hope that Mr. Khrushchev would eventually agree to the conclusion of a modus vivendi on the Berlin question. In order to prepare itself for such an eventuality, the Alliance would be well advised to review the various proposals already advanced in this context, bearing in mind that no settlement or modus vivendi could be acceptable unless it gave the city a prospect for the future equivalent or superior to that which it had under the present arrangements.

39. Recalling that at the Athens Ministerial Meeting he had drawn attention to the poor state of the Soviet and satellite economies and the disarray within the Communist system of alliances, Lord Home recommended that the West, backed by its increasingly evident cultural, economic and political attractions, should attempt to exploit these weaknesses, as suggested in the Report on the Situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany (C-M(62)111). Obviously the objective of such a strategy should not be to foment disorder and revolution in Eastern Europe, but simply to weaken the Soviet hold upon this area.

40. The main purpose of the Chinese attack upon India had evidently been to humiliate the latter in the eyes of its Asian neighbours. While this objective had in some measure been achieved, and although the question of Kashmir seriously prejudiced the security of the sub-Continent, the Chinese action against the leading unaligned country had aroused 400 million Asians from their torpor and wrecked the image of Communism as a champion of

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peace. Moreover, even if India remained officially unaligned, it must henceforth be committed to the Western World.

41. As a result of the serious Sino-Soviet dispute, and in particular of the Chinese attack upon India, it might be expected that during the coming generation the Soviet Union would look increasingly to the West, and that a détente could thus ultimately be achieved. While, therefore, the vigilance and preparedness of the Alliance must be maintained, it should be alert to seize upon any indication of a pro-Western evolution in Soviet policy, in the knowledge that the Soviet Union was now reacting to the West rather than vice versa, that recent Communist initiatives had increased neutral support for the West, and that the balance of power had shifted to the detriment of Communism.

42. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece) said that the Cuban crisis had illustrated that without the Castro régime there would have been no Soviet missiles installed in Cuba. Therefore, a country which turned Communist represented a potential military danger for the West. A second point which should be noticed about the crisis was that, although the Soviet leadership had drawn back, it had done so in an area where it had made a significant and daring advance in the very recent past, and not in an area which had been under its control for a long time. Moreover, it had not withdrawn its presence completely, since it still maintained a political hold on the island. The withdrawal itself was yet another sign of its capacity for rapid tactical changes. A third lesson which should be noted was that a secret incursion into Cuba, worthy of Stalin himself, had taken place in the context of continuing de-Stalinisation and Soviet emphasis on peaceful co-existence. Despite Mr. Khrushchev's pronouncements on the non-inevitability of war, the danger of war persisted, and continued vigilance and unity were necessary on the part of the West. Another aspect of the Cuban affair was its possible repercussions on the chances of achieving some measure of disarmament. It had been the first occasion on which the Soviet Union had, by a show of force, been led to believe that the United States was fully determined to risk everything to preserve its interests. This development perhaps offered some slight hope for progress in disarmament. In this connection, while supporting the remarks of other Ministers on the world context which should characterise measures for disarmament, he thought that regional disarmament proposals covering whole continents such as Africa and Latin America might be useful. The Cuban crisis had also once more underlined the importance of conventional forces. The point to be remembered was that effective conventional forces could not be established overnight, but must be built up by long and careful preparations.

43. He also wished to underline the value of the firmness and wisdom of the United States' attitude during the crisis and the wisdom of its restraint in victory. As to the need for consultation within the Alliance, which had been raised in connection with

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the crisis, he of course supported the principle of consultation. However it must be recognised that there were cases which called for immediate and secret action. In such cases, action without consultation was preferable to consultation without action.

44. As to the Berlin question, this must still be regarded as most serious. The West was in Berlin by contractual right, and maintained its position there in the cause of freedom. The Soviet Union had arrived at its present position by flouting its contractual rights. Any concession by the West, either in form or in substance, to Soviet demands could have the most disastrous consequences on public opinion not only in the neutral countries but also in the countries of the Alliance. This did not mean, however, that the West should adopt a position of complete immobility on the question. It could accept a solution on condition that it had the agreement of all the interested parties.

45. In conclusion, with regard to the decision of the Athens Ministerial Meeting concerning the economic problems of Greece and Turkey, he paid tribute to the steps being taken by the Turkish Government to establish a sound economy in Turkey and to the successful operation of the consortium on Turkey.

46. Mr. LANGE (Norway) associated himself with the conclusions of Lord Home. He agreed that the situation was at present characterised by many uncertainties. The Cuban crisis, although well beyond its most acute stage, had still not been finally liquidated and there were no precise indications of the Soviet Union's future intentions with regard to the island. Similarly, there was considerable uncertainty as to what would be the final result of current internal developments in the Communist Bloc. Something fundamental was undoubtedly happening and the West was no longer faced with a monolithic Sino-Soviet alliance. Howevever, it was too early to assess exactly how fundamental this division was and what would be its outcome. Also, it was difficult to predict what would be the consequences of the dvision on the external relations of the Soviet Union and China, although he shared Lord Home's feeling that they could be in the long run beneficial to the West, in the form of some degree of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, there was always the possibility that the division would result in either Russia or China adopting a more aggressive attitude. Another area of uncertainty was related to the conflict between India and China and possible future developments.

47. As to the question of Berlin, he thought that the threatened peace treaty had been postponed because of the Soviet Union's need for a period of reflection. The recent series of talks between the Soviet Union and the West in various contexts, which had been reported to the Council in permanent session, led him to the conclusion that there had so far been no change in the substance of the Soviet Union's position, although the timing of its intentions had been influenced by events. On the question of

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disarmament, he had found the reports from Geneva during the last few weeks rather discouraging on the whole. However, the Soviet Union evidently wished to keep the negotiations going.

The West should exert considerable caution for the moment, since he saw no encouragement from the other side to seek a broad and formal diplomatic confrontation in the near future. However, it was equally important that the existing contacts, especially those between the Soviet Union and the United States, be maintained on the various issues. The West should avoid by any word or deed closing any opportunities for taking the initiative.

48. While there were many uncertainties as to the Soviet position on the substance of all these problems, it was apparent that the Soviet Union did not wish to push issues to a conclusion, or generally excite the international atmosphere or disrupt existing international machinery. The election of U Thant as Secretary General of the United Nations and the specific abandonment of the "troika" proposal showed that the Soviet Union no longer wished for the moment to cause a general deadlocking of the Organization.

49. Although NATO should be cautious about taking the initiative at present, while the Soviet Government was in the process of reassessing the international situation, it should use the lull to prepare itself politically and diplomatically for taking the initiative at the appropriate time. As much importance should be given to political as to military and economic contingency planning. NATO should not only react quickly and firmly in an emergency, but also take constructive initiatives whenever the opportunity arose.

50. The exchanges between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev during the Cuban crisis had raised expectations of the advent of a more fruitful period of East-West negotiations. These expectations should be borne in mind during the drafting of the final Communiqué on this meeting, which should not give the impression of negativism or immobilism

51. Mr. NOGUEIRA (Portugal) observed that international tension had in no way decreased during recent months, there being new areas of friction and danger. These had not in any sense been created or provoked by the West and it must be concluded that the aggressive and expansionist ambitions of international Communism were continuing unchanged. In some Western circles it was believed that a far-reaching reappraisal of Soviet foreign policy was currently taking place. Nevertheless, in the absence of any reliable means of assessment it could be assumed that changes would occur only in the methods and tactics employed. It must be concluded that the long-term objectives of Soviet policy remained unchanged.

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52. Some Western observers believed that the policy of "peaceful co-existence" was working against the interests of the Soviet Union and that for this reason it might at some time in the future be abandoned. He felt that this opinion was not born out by events, as had been shown by the extent of Soviet encroachment in the Caribbean. The West should guard against Soviet attempts to create a false impression of security by bringing down world tension only to facilitate further attacks and encroachments in other areas. It must be expected that there would be a continued confrontation between East and West, sometimes in unexpected places.

53. He appreciated the real and serious threat to both the United States in particular, and the West in general, which the Cuban crisis had presented, and he fully acknowledged the need for appropriate measures to remove this threat. He felt, that the danger was by no means removed and that it was likely to remain for a very long time. He asked the Council to consider whether the existence of a firmly entrenched Communist régime in Cuba was not more dangerous in the long term to the security of Latin America than the installation of offensive missiles on Cuban soil. The presence of a major Communist influence in Latin America, represented a constant threat to the area. He felt that this consideration placed the Cuban crisis in a different perspective and made it difficult to accept that the outcome of events had been a clear-cut defeat for the USSR or a clear-cut victory for the United States. The smoothness with which the Soviet decisions had been taken during the crisis, and the careful avoidance of any justification for an American attack indicated that the Soviets were at least partially prepared in advance for all events. It would be unrealistic to presume that the Soviets had hoped to conceal their missile bases from discovery. He realised that governments were well aware of this, but felt that public opinion should be encouraged to look less at the Soviet retreat and more at the implications of Fidel Castro's rise to power, and the methods by which it had taken place and by which Soviet influence had obtained such a dangerous foothold in the area. The West should give support in Latin America only to those statesmen whose pro-Western sympathies were not in doubt.

54. His Government had appreciated the military reasoning which had governed the United States action and felt that the United States had been fully entitled to react in the way that she had. Nevertheless, he frankly voiced his concern at the possible repercussions of the use of a naval blockade, in peacetime, for which the legal basis was not apparent. No nation depending on sea communications could afford to ignore its implications. It could be argued that Cuba had not violated any provisions of the United Nations Charter; also, Cuba lay outside the NATO area. However, although the legal framework for allied support of the American action had been weak, he welcomed the fact that it had nevertheless been possible to present a solid front during the crisis. This solidarity must be applied globally and consistently if the West were to face adequately the Soviet challenge. It could

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be confidently expected that the Soviet Union would rapidly exploit any gaps in this solidarity. He asked the Council to consider whether the NATO Alliance was at present in a position adequately to meet a similar crisis elsewhere in areas where Soviet ideological infiltration might suddenly increase.

55. Mr. COUVE de MURVILLE (France) said that after the very detailed analyses that had just been made, he would confine himself to a few general remarks on the conclusions which in the French Government's view could be drawn from the highly important events that had taken place during the last few months. One fact seemed to him to dominate everything else and that was the extraordinary difference between the situation which prevailed at the present session and the situation which was obtained at the one in December, 1961. In his opinion this change, which seemed a rather surprising one, had revealed a truth from which lessons should be drawn: that in the last analysis, everything depended on relative military strength. This truth, which in everyday international life was concealed by diplomacy or procedure in a quite startling way, emerged when the major powers came face to face. These remarks not only applied to what was happening in Cuba but also to what was happening between China and India.

56. Referring to the Cuban crisis, he said that it had developed in quite a different way from the Berlin crisis, which was a great deal more complex and involved a very large number of countries, whereas over Cuba, there had been a direct confrontation of the world's two major military powers. He thought it had arisen as the result of miscalculation on the part of one of the powers; but the other power, which had quite rightly considered itself to be directly threatened, had reacted immediately in the appropriate way, that is, nationally, and had immediately taken military steps, at the same time laying down its conditions to the other party. In his view, Russia had at once accepted the United States terms because it was unwilling to go as far as a nuclear war, thus justifying the statements made by the United States since the Athens meeting about the very considerable superiority of United States nuclear weapons over those of the Soviet Union. He added that in this crisis the other member countries of the Alliance had immediately made common cause with the United States and approved its action, even before it resulted in success, having quite rightly felt that they were automatically involved in the same way as the United States.

57. The most acute stage of the long-standing crisis between China and India had developed at almost the same time as the crisis between Russia and the United States, and in circumstances which had some similarity. Thus, in both cases the action taken was clearly of an aggressive and even cynical nature. He thought China had been influenced by a variety of reasons but felt that, in addition to the frontier issue, there was a more serious factor which was the desire to humiliate India and by so doing to establish itself as the major power in Asia. As for

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the third major event in the recent past, i.e. the crisis between China and Russia, which had now become acute, he considered it was bound up with the others and that it constituted a phenomenon of paramount importance which might, in the fairly near future, affect force relations in the world and weigh heavily on coming events.

58. As regards the conclusions to be drawn from these three major events, he stated firstly that, once the Cuban affair had been settled by the United States, there still remained the problem of the régime now established in Cuba and its repercussions on Latin America. The second conclusion was that in the present situation and in the initial stages of developments the scope of which could not be assessed, it was important not to draw hasty conclusions. With regard to the Atlantic Alliance in particular, he thought the future depended on the direction taken by Soviet policy after this setback, but he felt that any speculation on this trend would be unwise. For the moment, the only thing that could be said was that Russia was, to a certain extent, soft-pedalling on the Berlin and certain other problems; and that in his last speech Mr. Khrushchev had officially admitted the existence of the Sino-Russian crisis. He therefore suggested waiting for events to take their course in order to see whether possibilities of a détente might emerge from the Russian side so that talks could be held and relations subsequently put on a normal footing. For the time being however he suggested viewing these prospects with caution.

59. Mr. RUSK (United States) thanked the last two speakers for pointing to an element of the Cuban question to which he had only briefly referred that morning. The Castro régime was the great pre-occupation of all the peoples of the Western hemisphere. The departure of the offensive weapons should not be looked on as bringing the Cuban issue to an end, since it was the presence of this kind of régime in the Western hemisphere which was a threat to the peace and security of that hemisphere. Written into the whole structure of the inter-American system was the concept that there were two points with respect to Cuba which were not negotiable: firstly, the military-politcal connection between Cuba and the Soviet Union, and secondly the interference by Cuba in the affairs of other States in the hemisphere. The United States considered that its action had a solid legal foundation in the Rio Treaty, and that it was consistent with international law. In any event, as far as security was concerned, the countries of the Western hemisphere looked on the Rio Treaty - which Cuba had never denounced - as the law of that hemisphere with respect to security.

60. In conclusion, the COUNCIL:

(1) took note of the statements by Ministers on East/West Relations and Berlin;

(2) took note of the following documents:

(a) Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy. Report by the Expert Working Group: document: C-M(62)109;

(b) The Situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany. Report by the Expert Working Group: document: C-M(62)111;

(c) Policy towards the East European Satellites. Report by the Committee of Political Advisers: document: C-M(62)143;

(3) agreed to resume discussion on the international situation in the afternoon of the next day.

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