

## FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1949, WESTERN EUROPE, VOLUME IV

840.20/2-149: Telegram

### *The Ambassador in Norway (Bay) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

OSLO, February 1, 1949—6 p. m.

68. At my request Foreign Minister [Lange] invited me Foreign Office this p. m. Also present were British Ambassador Collier and Secretary General Skylstad. Lange handed us text Norwegian answer Soviet note January 29<sup>1</sup> scheduled release press tomorrow morning (Embtel 69, February 1). Russian note he volunteered had incited resentment [Page 61] Norwegian Government. Lange stated Norwegian Ambassador London, Prebensen, will call British Foreign Office while Morgenstierne<sup>2</sup> scheduled arrive Washington February 6, will request meeting Secretary State February 7 to make full report Scandinavian meetings ending in disagreement Oslo January 30.

Referring specifically paragraph 5 of reply, Lange says Morgenstierne and Prebensen will request fuller explanation basic concept Atlantic Pact including extent of area covered, reciprocal obligations and such additional information as Norwegian Foreign Office believes required for full Storting discussions prior reaching decision whether accept invitation join Pact. Lange elaborated orally on paragraph 6, stating although Government opposed to providing bases in Norway to any foreign government, it would nevertheless be consistent with Norwegian policy enter into discussions of and preparation for defense against possible attack. Norway prepared initiate conferences near future western powers primarily US to plan military strategy and defense. Morgenstierne will therefore ask Secretary of State how much and how soon US military aid to Norway forthcoming under Pact.

Lange explained rock on which Oslo meeting foundered was Norway's determination remain free initiate and pursue military discussions at any and all times. Sweden obdurately negative this point. Lange expressed appreciation Deptel 36 January 28, stating this proved most helpful in buttressing final Norwegian stand.

Lange admitted Labor Party split but not sufficiently to block favorable Storting vote on pact. Asked whether Soviet note would accentuate party division, Lange replied note would strengthen dissent by still undisillusioned believers in Soviet social system. Together with die-hard supporters, Scandinavian neutrality and those possibly influenced by Danish decision (see below) number dissenters would be further increased. Government particularly concerned these defections in election year.

Lange now extremely doubtful Danes will join Atlantic Pact. Danish delegation informs Lange joining would split Government Social Democratic Party through middle and Government probably unwilling risk such split.

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Asked whether Swedes might change minds later, Lange considered this impossible. Swedish delegation confirmed their neutrality based on strategic considerations since Sweden considers itself ideologically and economically lined [linked?] to west.

Questioned on Morgenstjerne opinion expressed Department Norway not likely oppose inclusion Italy Atlantic Pact Lange expressed contrary view contending Norway views Mediterranean not integral part North Atlantic.

Sent Department 68, pouched Stockholm, Copenhagen, Moscow.

**BAY**

1. Den sovjetiske note af 29. januar 1949 opfordrede bl.a. den norske regering til at "klarlægge den norske regerings stilling i spørgsmålet om Atlanterhavspagten" og om "at meddele, om den norske regering påtager sig nogen forpligtelser over for Atlanterhavspagten med hensyn til placering af militære fly eller flådebaser på Norges territorium". I det norske svar den 1. februar 1949 siges det bl.a. i afsnit 5, at eftersom forhandlingerne om et nordisk forsvarsforbund mellem de tre skandinaviske lande ikke har resulteret i den nødvendige enighed om forudsætninger og konsekvenser af et sådant forbund, vil den norske regering under hensyn til landets beliggenhed ved Atlanterhavet og dets stilling som udpræget søfartsnation undersøge former og vilkår for Norges deltagelse i et regionalt sikkerhedssystem, der omfatter landene ved Atlanterhavet. I afsnit 6 i det norske svar siges det, at Norge "ikke vil tiltræde nogen overenskomst med andre stater, som indebærer forpligtelser for Norge til at åbne baser for fremmede magters stridskræfter på norsk territorium, så længe Norge ikke er angrebet eller udsat for trusler om angreb."

2. Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstjerne, den norske ambassadør i USA.

Kilde: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v04/d47> (FRUS, 1949, bind IV, s. 60-62)

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