

## FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1949, WESTERN EUROPE, VOLUME IV

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### *The Ambassador in Sweden (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

STOCKHOLM, February 2, 1949—3 p. m.

130. Ambassador Boheman who is leaving today for Washington told me last evening that he was neither greatly surprised nor too unhappy about the "failure" of the Oslo conference. He said the Danes were the most upset but he did not know whether Hedtoft's principal anxiety was over the possible splitting of his party and its internal political effect or over Denmark's international position. He said the Norwegians had suggested some formula permitting "unilateral American guarantee" of a Scandinavian alliance but he had opposed this as "the worst possible solution." He said the meeting had not lasted long. The Swedes had presented their formula supported by the Danes, which was unacceptable to the Norwegians; the latter presented theirs which was unacceptable to Sweden and the meeting was over.

Boheman remarked that he thought the Norwegian position favoring adherence to the Atlantic Pact was the right one "if war were imminent within the next year" but since he thinks it is not likely within five years he believes Swedish position was the sound one and the one most likely to keep the Soviet cold war away from Scandinavia. He said the Norwegians seemed surprised at the Soviet *démarche*<sup>1</sup> but he could not understand why because it was the natural thing to expect. He emphasized that it had no effect on the conference deliberations and that they did not know about it until the decisions had been taken. The serious thing for Scandinavia, he said, was Norway's association in the Atlantic Pact for this would bring the pressure on this area and would make Finland's position more difficult. If Norway joins, however, he sees no reason why the Danes should not follow suit but he was not yet certain that Norway would adhere to the Atlantic Pact.

I asked him the meaning of the phrase "at present" in the Oslo communiqué and whether it implied that there were plans for further talks. He said no, and that the phrase had been put in on the insistence of the Danes who did not want to give up hope and of the Norwegians who thought it would ease the shock to public opinion. Swedes, he said had no interest either way and he considered Scandinavian pact plans a dead issue.

Sent Department 130; repeated Oslo 33, Copenhagen 36, London 42, Paris 40, Moscow 26.

MATTHEWS

1. Den sovjetiske note af 29. januar 1949 til den norske regering.

Kilde: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v04/d49> (FRUS, 1949, bind IV, s. 63)

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