

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1948, WESTERN EUROPE, VOLUME III

759.61/3-1248

The Ambassador in Denmark (Marvel) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

COPENHAGEN, March 12, 1948—3 p. m.

230. When I asked Foreign Minister last evening what Denmark's reaction would be in event of Soviet request similar to that made Finland he replied matter had not been considered by Cabinet but his personal view with which he was certain Hedtoft would agree, was that Denmark's reply would be a flat no. He added even in event USSR requested non-aggression pact Denmark would also flatly refuse to enter into such agreement. He pointed out Denmark had non-aggression pact with Germany while Norway did not, yet both were attacked simultaneously. He went on to say Denmark, by joining with Norway or Benelux, would not stop Soviet aggression. He said this could be stopped only by clear declaration by US that limit of Soviet advance has been reached and any further act of aggression would be promptly met by force. He said only such a declaration by US would carry weight with Soviet. He was hopeful such stand would be taken and openly declared by US. He said that it was within possibilities Denmark would be forced to seek military alliance with US. He hoped this would not occur before Marshall Plan had gone into effect so as to avoid implication ERP had military strings attached to it.

Sent Dept as 230, repeated Stockholm 17, Oslo 12.

MARVEL

Dansk oversættelse:

Telegram fra den amerikanske ambassadør i Danmark (Marvel) til den amerikanske udenrigsminister

HEMMEGLIT

København, den 12. marts 1948 kl. 15.

230. Da jeg i aftes spurgte udenrigsministeren [Gustav Rasmussen] om, hvad Danmarks reaktion ville være i tilfælde af en sovjetisk anmodning [om en gensidig venskabs- og bistandstraktat] magen til den, som Finland har fået, svarede han, at sagen ikke havde været drøftet i regeringen, men hans personlige opfattelse, som han var sikker på, at [statsminister] Hedtoft delte, var at Danmarks svar ville være et blankt nej. Han tilføjede, at selv i tilfælde af, at Sovjetunionen anmodede om en ikke-angrebstraktat, ville Danmark også blankt afvise at gå ind i en sådan aftale. Han påpegede, at Danmark, men ikke Norge, havde haft en ikke-angrebstraktat med Tyskland, og dog var begge lande blevet angrebet samtidig. Han sagde videre, at Danmark ved at gå sammen med Norge eller Benelux-landene ikke ville kunne standse sovjetisk aggression. Han sagde, at det alene kunne standses ved en klar amerikansk erklæring om, at grænsen for sovjetisk fremtrængen er nået, og at enhver yderligere aggression straks vil blive imødegået med magt. Han sagde, at kun en sådan amerikansk erklæring ville gøre indtryk på Sovjetunionen. Han håbede, at USA ville tage sådan et standpunkt og erklære det åbent. Han sagde, at det var muligt, at Danmark ville blive tvunget til at søge et militært forbund med USA. Han håbede, at dette ikke ville ske før Marshall-planen var iværksat, så at der ikke skulle opstå en opfattelse af, at det europæiske genopbygningsprogram [Marshall-planen] havde militære forgreninger.

Kilde: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v03/d42> (FRUS, 1948, bind III, s. 51)

© koldkrig-online.dk 2021