

## FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1948, WESTERN EUROPE, VOLUME III

840.20/12-1748: Telegram

### *The Ambassador in Denmark (Marvel) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

COPENHAGEN, December 17, 1948—5 p. m.

1090. I had most friendly and open discussion today on Danish foreign policy with Minister of Finance Hansen, Minister of Commerce Krag and Minister without portfolio Buhl. All three emphasize the importance from Danish viewpoint of delaying invitation to Denmark regarding North Atlantic pact until conclusion of present Nordic talks. While expressing skepticism as to success of negotiating Nordic defense agreement all were strongly of view governments should not be complicated or embarrassed by Denmark or Norway facing decision on western proposal. All indicated personal view in event Nordic talks were unsuccessful Denmark, if Norway did likewise, would join North Atlantic pact but qualified opinion by pointing out decision must be made by whole Cabinet. In event Nordic pact was successfully arranged all anticipated greater hesitancy on part of Denmark immediately to accept invitation to join North Atlantic pact.

All understand North Atlantic pact to be defensive agreement and believe Russian propaganda that such is for purpose of making Denmark spearhead for attack on Russia carries no weight with Danish public. All realize time is of the essence and that Denmark must face a decision in February. All were insistent that terms of North Atlantic pact should limit Denmark obligations to acts of aggression committed within defined territorial bounds. I was surprised to reaction of Buhl who is considered Nestor of Socialist Party when he stated that occupation of Greenland would be one of the first objectives of Russians with result Denmark would immediately come into war and consequently some arrangement for its protection must be made between Denmark and US. Pie quickly added other side was that Danes should cancel present Greenland treaty and thus avoid Russian criticism. But when asked admitted first statement was his personal view. All were satisfied that Russia alone could be considered as only possible aggressor against Denmark and that Nordic defense [Page 324] agreement in itself would not be strong enough. All agreed it was advisable for Danish Government to consider now all aspects and consequences of Denmark's joining North Atlantic pact so that a prompt reply can be given when the invitation to join is forthcoming. As to special terms which I have previously indicated Danes will attempt to obtain, inquiries were made as to whether Marshall aid would continue after 1952 to all countries who join North Atlantic pact; whether US would insist on no east-west trade; what were the terms and conditions on which military equipment would be made available to Denmark; what military assistance could Danes expect in case of invasion of Denmark to all of which I replied I had no knowledge.

These three Cabinets members plus Prime Minister Hedtoft in substance constitute Danish Government. My impression is if present talks fail to produce Nordic defense agreement, Denmark can be brought into North Atlantic pact on rebound from shock of non-cooperation of a blindly neutral Sweden.

Sent Department, pouched Oslo, Stockholm.

MARVEL

Kilde: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v03/d196> (FRUS, 1948, bind III, s. 323-24)

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