

~~SECRET~~

COPY NO. _____

MC 67/1

2 July 1959

Pages 1 - 10. Incl.

A REPORT BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

to the

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

on

THE NATO ALERT SYSTEM

References: a. SG 129/4 (Revised)(Final)
b. MC 67 (Revised)(Final)
c. MC 70 (Final)

SECTION I

SUMMARY

REGRADED NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Per Authority IMSM-431-99

By ...*C. REUSEN*... Date *24/8/99*...

INTRODUCTORY MEMORANDUM

1. The Military Committee has examined existing guidance on development of measures to be taken in times of tension and on or after warning of attack in the light of MC 70 (Final), "The Minimum Essential Force Requirements, 1958-1963". Its detailed report is contained in Section II.

2. SG 129/4 (Revised)(Final), "Measures to be Taken on and After Warning of an Attack", provided guidance on formal alert measures. The ratification of the Paris Agreements, the Austrian Treaty and questions that have been raised concerning the interpretation of certain parts of the document necessitate a revision of that paper.

3 ENCLOSURES

1. The Formal Alert System
2. The State of Military Vigilance
3. The Counter-Surprise Military System

REGRADED

NATO
SECRET

Per Authority DOCUMENT RECLASSIFICATION MEMO. #7

By *JCR* Date *9 Oct 68*

DISTRIBUTION: A, B, C, D, E1-3, 9, 10, F, G, L

MC 67/I

-1-

SECTION I

NATO
SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 3. MC 67 (Revised)(Final), "Allied Command Europe
2 Counter-Surprise Military Alert System", provided guidance
3 to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) for the
4 establishment of the Allied Command Europe Counter-Surprise
5 Military Alert System. Revision of that document is necessary
6 to reflect changes proposed by SACEUR and approved by the
7 Standing Group.

8 4. MC 70 (Final) established a requirement for the
9 review of present alert systems with a view to simplification
10 and unification thereof.

11 5. This report supersedes and replaces both SG 129/4
12 (Revised)(Final) and MC 67 (Revised)(Final), and consolidates
13 in one document military guidance concerning alert measures.
14 It is a further step toward development of a comprehensive
15 alert system which will be responsive to military require-
16 ments in the foreseeable future, and toward the use, as far
17 as possible, of standardized alert measures and terminology
18 throughout NATO.

CONCLUSIONS

19 6. The Military Committee concludes that:

20 a. This report and its enclosures, setting out the
21 formal alert system, the state of military vigilance
22 and the counter-surprise military system, should be
23 approved as guidance for the NATO alert system;

24 b. The authority to declare the various alert
25 stages as set out in Enclosures 1, 2 and 3 should be
26 confirmed;

27 c. It is of the utmost importance that national
28 authorities, to the maximum extent possible, delegate

NATO
SECRET

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

1 in advance to Major NATO Commanders* authority to order
2 the implementation of the individual measures of the
3 alert system. Negotiations between national authori-
4 ties and Major NATO Commanders should continue to this
5 end.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6 7. The Military Committee recommends that the North
7 Atlantic Council:
8 a. Approve this report and its conclusions;
9 b. Request the Secretary General to establish and
10 keep under continuing review procedures whereby the
11 Standing Group or the appropriate Major NATO Commander
12 can rapidly obtain political guidance on alert measures,
13 in times of tension and in the event of armed attack
14 or threat of armed attack against NATO, from the
15 Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council
16 through the Secretary General or, in an extreme emergency,
17 from the individual governments concerned.

*SACEUR, SACLANT and the Allied Commanders-in-Chief Channel,
as defined on page 7, MC 57/1. "Major commands" are
their respective commands.

~~SECRET~~
MC 67/1

- 3 -

SECTION I

(Page revised by Corrig.No.3, 14 Jan 60)

NATO
SECRET

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE INSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

SECRET

TOP SECRET

SECTION IITHE NATO ALERT SYSTEMTHE PROBLEM

- 1 1. To provide Major NATO Commanders with guidance for
2 preparation of measures to be taken in times of tension and
3 on or after warning of attack.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROBLEM

- 4 2. a. The Soviet capability for surprise and massive
5 initial onslaught;
6 b. The existence of ballistic missiles capable of
7 delivering mass destruction weapons against NATO with
8 warning to NATO being measured in minutes;
9 c. The probable non-availability of an effective
10 anti-ballistic missile system through the mid-
11 1960s;
12 d. The wholly defensive nature of NATO and the
13 deterrent mission and strategic concept of NATO forces,
14 which mean that hostilities, if initiated, will be
15 initiated by the Soviets and in all probability by a
16 means and at a time and place of their choosing;
17 e. The reluctance of national authorities to
18 release from national control, prior to the outbreak
19 or imminent outbreak of hostilities, the authority
20 to institute preparatory measures which could be con-
21 sidered unsettling, threatening or warlike;
22 f. The vital need for Major NATO Commanders to
23 be given adequate authority to prepare and position
24 NATO forces, when an attack may be imminent, so as to
25 insure that they can survive and retain their capability
26 to carry out their missions effectively.

MC 67/1

-4-

SECTION II

NATO
SECRET

DISCUSSION

1 3. A carefully thought out and accepted alert plan is
2 essential to successful accomplishment of the defensive
3 mission of NATO military forces. All protective measures
4 that can possibly be taken prior to the outbreak of hostili-
5 ties must be taken, particularly since an attack may occur
6 with little or no warning. Failure to take necessary pro-
7 tective measures may well result in disaster.

8 4. It is recognized that many of these protective
9 measures have political implications. It is also recognized
10 that each government reserves to itself the authority to
11 commit its nation to war. If any appreciable period marks
12 the transition from peace to war, there may be time to get
13 political agreement to place the required preliminary
14 measures in effect. However, in view of the probability
15 that there will not be enough time to permit NATO nations
16 to meet and agree, Major NATO Commanders must have the
17 necessary authority in advance to direct the timely exe-
18 cution of precautionary measures within the framework of
19 agreements previously reached with the governments concerned.
20 This procedure is entirely consistent with the very great
21 responsibilities which NATO nations have placed on the
22 Major NATO Commanders. It should not be construed as
23 superseding or abrogating the rights of national authorities
24 or higher NATO authority, but rather as a delegation of
25 authority to take certain necessary actions.

26 5. It is recognized that certain nations may with-
27 hold prior agreement on the execution of certain measures.
28 Procedures should be established to facilitate prompt con-
29 sideration and approval of any measures upon which nations
30 have made reservations.

MC 67/1

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 6. Due to the many political implications, authority
2 to declare an alert requires careful consideration. At the
3 outset it must be recognized that a military commander has
4 the right and the responsibility to take appropriate pro-
5 tective measures for the security and the defense of his
6 command when his forces are imminently menaced. During a
7 critical period when the military forces are not imminently
8 menaced, but may be so at any moment, a situation could
9 exist under which implementation of certain alert measures
10 possibly would affect adversely the chances for success of
11 political negotiations being conducted with the object of
12 preventing or delaying the outbreak of war. Under this
13 situation, military commanders must exercise the greatest
14 caution. A situation also can be visualized under which
15 political authorities might desire certain military demon-
16 strations. Thus, it can be readily seen that there must
17 be the closest coordination and cooperation between mili-
18 tary and political authorities, particularly in time of
19 crisis. Military commanders must be kept informed of
20 political views and objectives. Likewise, political authori-
21 ties must be informed of the military appreciation of the
22 situation and, when appropriate, receive recommendations
23 from military authorities.

24 7. The nature and extent of political guidance to
25 NATO commanders in times of tension and in the event of
26 armed attack or threat of armed attack against NATO cannot
27 be defined in advance. The Standing Group, or the appro-
28 priate Major NATO Commander concerned, should seek this
29 guidance from the Permanent Representatives to the North
30 Atlantic Council through the Secretary General or, in an
31 extreme emergency, from the individual governments concerned.
32 In situations of this character, time is of the utmost

~~TOP SECRET~~

-6-

SECTION II

MC 6771

NATO

(Page revised by Corrig.No.1, 30 Nov 59)

SECRET

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NATO
SECRET

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

1 importance. Procedures should, therefore, be established by
2 which decisions can be conveyed through the Permanent Repre-
3 sentatives and the Secretary General to the Standing Group and
4 the Major NATO Commanders with a minimum of delay.

5 8. In a sudden and extreme emergency, circumstances
6 may well arise where there will not be time for the Standing
7 Group or the Major NATO Commanders to obtain political guid-
8 ance through the Council. It is a hard reality, demonstrated
9 by the arduous and protracted negotiations which have already
10 taken place between national authorities and the Major NATO
11 Commanders, that nations are extremely reluctant in peacetime
12 to release from national control the authority to institute
13 preparatory measures which could be considered unsettling,
14 threatening or warlike. There is, however, a manifest urgent
15 need for rapid coordinated action in the face of attack or
16 imminent attack (which may be delivered without previous warn-
17 ing by ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads), to pre-
18 serve the integrity and combat potential of the NATO forces.
19 Governments should, therefore, wherever constitutional pro-
20 cedures allow, delegate to the Major NATO Commanders in peace-
21 time sufficient authority to order the implementation of the
22 necessary measures to preserve the integrity and combat
23 potential of the forces of their respective commands in the
24 event of a sudden and extreme emergency. The survival of the
25 Free World may depend upon this delegation of authority.

26 9. Transmission of Warning of Attack. The requirement
27 for the earliest possible warning of attack is recognized.
28 The transmission of such information is dealt with in a
29 separate document (SGM-537-57 with corrigenda).

THE ALERT SYSTEM

30 10. The alert system set out below has been devised to
31 assist in meeting these requirements. It is accepted that

~~SECRET~~
MC 67/1

-7-

SECTION II

(Page revised by Corrig.No.1, 30 Nov 59)

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE INSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 certain aspects of the system may not be relevant or suitable
2 for all the Major NATO Commands, and that Major NATO Com-
3 manders may omit such irrelevant and unsuitable aspects when
4 preparing their own plans. However, Major NATO Commanders
5 should coordinate their alert measures with each other, with
6 a view to standardization of alert measures and terminology
7 as far as possible.

8 11. The alert system consists of:

9 a. The Formal Alert System (Enclosure 1). This
10 provides for an orderly transition from peace to war in
11 circumstances marked by a period of deteriorating inter-
12 national relations and more or less gradually mounting
13 tensions, possibly followed by declared or undeclared
14 hostilities. It consists of political and military
15 measures and is divided into three stages, Simple Alert,
16 Reinforced Alert and General Alert;

17 b. The State of Military Vigilance (Enclosure 2).
18 This is designed for a period of delicate international
19 relations and consists of purely military precautionary
20 measures which can be kept up for a fairly long time
21 without ill effects and which would facilitate a rapid
22 transition, if necessary, to one of the stages of the
23 formal alert system or the counter-surprise military system;

24 c. The Counter-Surprise Military System (Enclosure 3)
25 This comprises those purely military measures which must
26 be taken to enable NATO forces to survive and retain the
27 capability to carry out their missions effectively under
28 circumstances (attack or imminent attack with little or
29 no warning) which cannot be met by the procedures for
30 instituting the formal alert system. It is divided into
31 two stages, State ORANGE and State SCARLET.

32 12. Authority to Declare the Various Stages of the Alert
33 System. Ideally the authority to declare any stage of the

1 alert system, which resides basically in the NATO nations,
2 should, for reasons of efficiency and urgency, be fully
3 delegated in advance to the Major NATO Commanders. In
4 practice, however, it must be accepted that some nations
5 will be prepared to delegate their authority only to a
6 limited extent and under prescribed conditions. Negotiations
7 on these matters between the Major NATO Commanders and
8 nations have already taken place and should continue until
9 delegation to the maximum extent possible is attained. The
10 rules defining the authority or authorities empowered to
11 declare the various stages of the alert system have already
12 been generally agreed in principle, although negotiations
13 on the individual measures are still in progress. The rules
14 are given in Enclosures 1, 2 and 3.

15 13. If, within the general framework defined in paragraph
16 7, Section II, one of the Major NATO Commanders has to ask
17 directly for political guidance, he must immediately inform
18 the Standing Group. In the event of an alert stage being
19 declared by a commander, action must be taken immediately
20 to inform the authorities of the governments concerned,
21 senior and neighboring commanders, the NATO Council and the
22 Standing Group.

23 14. Restrictions

24 a. Unless attacked, Major NATO Commanders and sub-
25 ordinates will exercise the greatest caution to insure
26 that no act of theirs can be interpreted as initiating
27 combat or providing the enemy with an excuse to level a
28 charge of provocation against NATO;

29 b. Action to be taken during the different stages
30 of alert is subject to previous agreement between Major
31 NATO Commanders and national authorities.

1 c. As a general rule, no publicity will be initiated
2 by military authorities with respect to the calling of
3 any stage of alert or the implementation of any specific
4 alert measures. However, military authorities must at
5 all times bear in mind the possible public information
6 implications of such actions and, when appropriate, make
7 suitable recommendations to the political authorities
8 concerned.

9 15. Changes or Additions.

10 a. Any changes or additions to the basic lists of
11 measures contained in the Enclosures relating to the
12 Formal Alert System (Enclosure 1) and Counter-Surprise
13 Military System (Enclosure 3) will be submitted to the
14 Standing Group for approval before any such revised lists
15 are used either as a basis for negotiations or in issuing
16 a declaration of an alert;

17 b. The list of measures of the State of Military
18 Vigilance (Enclosure 2) is a non-exhaustive list which
19 may be modified as circumstances warrant. However,
20 the Standing Group will be informed of any changes or
21 additions to the basic list of measures of the State
22 of Military Vigilance.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

23 16. See Section I, paragraphs 6 and 7.

ENCLOSURE 1

Pages 1 - 7, Incl.

THE FORMAL ALERT SYSTEM

1 1. Introduction. This Enclosure sets forth the formal
2 alert system.

3 2. Purpose and Concept. The formal alert system is a
4 system of political and military defensive and precautionary
5 measures which provides for an orderly transition from peace
6 to war in circumstances marked by a period of deteriorating
7 international relations and more or less gradually mounting
8 tensions possibly followed by declared or undeclared hosti-
9 lities. The system consists of three stages:

- 10 a. Simple Alert,
- 11 b. Reinforced Alert,
- 12 c. General Alert.

13 During these stages the NATO forces will be brought progress-
14 ively to a state of immediate readiness for war. Since the
15 exact amount of warning which will be received cannot be fore-
16 seen, alert plans must be flexible. Measures to be taken in
17 each stage should not be considered absolute since certain
18 measures may be applied by the appropriate authority for authori-
19 zing such measures at a stage earlier or later than planned.
20 The implementation of any selected measures from a later alert
21 stage on declaration of an earlier alert stage, even in an
22 emergency, requires the approval of the countries concerned,
23 which preferably should be arranged in advance.

SPECIFIC MEASURES

24 3. Simple Alert. Measures taken on declaration of the
25 simple alert will place assigned forces in a state of combat
26 readiness and should bring forces earmarked for assignment to
27 maximum attainable readiness for war. The measures taken during
28 this stage should, if possible, be covert, but need not necessar-
29 ily be so. No measures will be taken which might compromise or
30 disclose the overall operational plan. Action to be taken at this

NATO
SECRET

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

1 stage by Major NATO Commanders and/or national authorities, as
2 previously agreed between them, includes:

- 3 a. Alerting and bringing assigned forces and
4 their supporting units to effective strength, and
5 bringing forces earmarked for assignment to the maxi-
6 mum attainable state of combat readiness, including
7 the recall of personnel on leave or detached, and
8 the return to the parent organization of units which
9 have been detached for any reasons except operational;
10 b. Taking immediate precautionary measures against
11 surprise attack;
12 c. Protection of key points and deployment of
13 forces required for specific tasks of overriding
14 importance;
15 d. Alerting personnel designated as reinforce-
16 ments at a subsequent alert stage;
17 e. Implementation of the first stage of the
18 communications-electronics plan, and preparation for
19 the implementation of the national radio transmission
20 control plans;
21 f. Guarding against sabotage;
22 g. Preparation for the evacuation of selected non-
23 combatants and certain categories of personnel from
24 possible combat zones;
25 h. Increasing intelligence collection efforts. Pre-
26 parations for taking known enemy agents into custody.
27 Strengthening control of frontiers and intensifying sur-
28 veillance of refugees;
29 i. Requesting activation of NATO and national war-
30 time logistic agencies. Preliminary steps to place in
31 effect wartime logistic arrangements and procedures;
32 j. Preparation for activation of NATO and national
33 organizations for naval control of shipping; for

MC 67/1

-2-

Enclosure 1

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE INSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

1 control of fishing vessels; and for dispersion and
2 evacuation of merchant shipping;

3 k. Bringing air defense systems up to strength;

4 l. Preparation for deployment of forces required
5 for demolitions and minelaying;

6 m. Other purely military non-provocative measures
7 considered necessary by the Major NATO Commanders.

8 4. Reinforced Alert. Measures taken on declaration of
9 the reinforced alert must result in the maximum possible
10 preparation to meet an attack. The measures required cannot
11 be accomplished covertly; therefore, [this stage will be
12 initiated and completed only if there are conclusive indica-
13 tions that the outbreak of hostilities is imminent.] However,
14 the full deployment of forces and other measures which may
15 have political implications or which might compromise or
16 disclose operational plans must be accomplished with the
17 utmost caution consistent with the actual situation. The
18 implementation of these measures will require close coor-
19 dination between the Major NATO Commanders and the national
20 political and military authorities concerned. Action to be
21 taken at this stage by the Major NATO Commanders and/or
22 national authorities, as previously agreed between them,
23 includes:

24 a. All measures indicated under the simple alert,
25 if not previously effected;

26 b. The Major NATO Commanders and their immediate
27 subordinate commanders assume operational command. Their
28 authority is exercised over the assigned forces and also
29 over the earmarked forces when the latter are assigned;

30 c. Evacuation of selected non-combatants and
31 certain categories of personnel from potential combat
32 zones (if not previously achieved);

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

NATO
SECRET

- 1 d. Implementation of wartime logistic arrangements
2 and procedures. Withdrawal of any stockpiles remaining
3 in advanced locations;
- 4 e. Implementation of the second stage of the communi-
5 cations-electronics plan; and implementation of the
6 national radio transmission control plans, to the extent
7 that prior national agreement can be obtained;
- 8 f. Deployment of assigned air, ground and naval
9 forces, and of such earmarked forces as are available, to
10 operational areas; precautions to insure their logistic
11 support and security;
- 12 g. Defense of ports, including denial of access to
13 Soviet, satellite or suspicious shipping to Allied ports
14 and harbors;
- 15 h. Final preparations for demolitions, flooding and
16 land minelaying. Laying of defensive sea minefields;
- 17 i. Arrest or control of known or suspected enemy
18 agents;
- 19 j. Institution, in conjunction with national authori-
20 ties, of positive controls over air traffic, including
21 civil aviation;
- 22 k. Institution of positive controls over water trans-
23 port, merchant shipping and fishing vessels;
- 24 l. Diversion, dispersal and evacuation of means of
25 transportation, shipping and port equipment from
26 threatened or exposed areas and ports;
- 27 m. Mobilization of certain Allied formations, with
28 supporting units, urgently needed for reinforcing the
29 coverture forces. Request for assignment of certain
30 earmarked personnel;
- 31 n. Application of censorship and civilian movement
32 control.

- 33 5. General Alert. This stage marks the outbreak of
34 hostilities. On the declaration of a General Alert, operational

TO: [REDACTED]
MC 67/1

-4-

Enclosure 1

(Page revised by Corrig. No. 2, 14 Jan 60)

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE INSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

plans are implemented in accordance with Major NATO Commanders' emergency defense plans. Initial actions to be taken by the Major NATO Commanders and/or national authorities under the general alert include:

- a. All measures included under simple and reinforced alerts, if not previously taken;
- b. Implementation of security plans;
- c. Implementation of plans to control refugees or maintenance of measures taken at an earlier stage;
- d. Implementation of demolition plans;
- e. Implementation of communications-electronics plans and national radio transmission control plans, if not previously implemented;
- f. Initiation of operations to carry out the emergency defense plans.

6. Declaration of Alerts.

a. The simple alert normally will be declared by the Major NATO Commanders after obtaining approval of the governments through their Permanent Representatives on the NATO Council. In the event of a sudden and acute emergency, however, where the delay entailed in obtaining agreement of higher authority might endanger their forces, the Major NATO Commanders and their immediate subordinate commanders may declare a simple alert, either throughout their entire commands or in the affected areas as necessary. However, Major NATO Commanders and their immediate subordinate commanders may act only to the extent that authority to do so has been previously delegated by governments. The Major NATO Commanders and their immediate subordinate commanders must recommend to the national authorities the application of any measures which these authorities have reserved for their own decision;

b. The reinforced alert will be declared by the Major NATO Commanders normally after obtaining the approval of governments through their Permanent Representatives

NATO
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE INSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

on the Council. In the event that the situation is so urgent as to preclude obtaining prior approval through the Permanent Representatives to the Council, the Major NATO Commanders may, in consultation with the Standing Group and with the approval of the individual governments concerned, place in effect a reinforced alert or specific measures of this alert, either throughout their entire commands or in the affected areas as necessary;

c. The general alert shall be declared only upon the decision of the Council or on the authority of Permanent Representatives acting individually on behalf of their governments.

7. Action in the Event of Attack. Irrespective of the extent of alert measures in effect, in the event of an armed attack taking place anywhere in area defined in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949* as amended by the

*"ARTICLE 5. The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently, they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

"Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."

"ARTICLE 6. For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- (1) on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Department of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- (2) on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer."

MC 67/1

NATO
SECRET

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

1 protocols relating to Greece, Turkey and the Federal Republic
2 of Germany, and pending the decisions of NATO nations in
3 accordance with Article 5 of the Treaty, the following pro-
4 cedures will be followed:

5 a. Commanders of national forces attacked or
6 menaced will, in carrying out their national responsi-
7 bilities, conduct their operations in consonance with
8 appropriate emergency defense plans of Major NATO
9 Commanders;

10 b. At the same time, the Major NATO Commanders
11 will call upon commanders of national forces and upon
12 national authorities to carry out such of the alert
13 measures not already in effect as the Major NATO Com-
14 manders deem necessary in appropriate areas of their
15 commands.

~~TOP SECRET~~
MC 67/1

-7-

Enclosure 1

NATO
SECRET

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE INSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

ENCLOSURE 2Pages 1 - 4, Incl.

THE STATE OF MILITARY VIGILANCE

1 1. Introduction. This Enclosure sets forth the state
2 of military vigilance. It is complementary to the formal
3 alert system and the counter-surprise military system. It
4 is not a substitute for either.

5 2. Purpose and Concept. The state of military vigilance
6 is a state of readiness achieved by the adoption of certain
7 military precautionary measures during periods of delicate
8 international relations which do not warrant the implementa-
9 tion of either the formal alert system or the counter-
10 surprise military system, but which do warrant some pre-
11 paratory action by the NATO forces. The purpose of the
12 state of military vigilance is to put the NATO forces in such
13 a posture as to be able to respond quickly to meet an emergency
14 situation. It facilitates passage, in case of necessity,
15 to one of the stages of the formal alert system or the
16 counter-surprise military system. The measures, of which
17 a non-exhaustive list is given below as a basis, can be
18 adapted to local conditions and are such that they can be
19 continued for several weeks, or even months, without major
20 disadvantages. It is possible to return from the state of
21 military vigilance to a normal military situation without
22 difficulty as soon as the international situation has
23 improved sufficiently. The system can be rehearsed in
24 connection with, or under cover of, scheduled training
25 exercises.

26 3. Applicability. The state of military vigilance has
27 primary applicability in Allied Command Europe. Its use in

1 other Major NATO Commands is an optional matter to be deter-
2 mined by the appropriate Major NATO Commander.

3 4. Specific Measures. Action to be taken at this state
4 includes:

5 a. Increased duty personnel at formation and unit
6 headquarters;

7 b. War headquarters to be manned by skeleton staff;

8 c. Progressive implementation of the emergency
9 communications plan, in line with manning of the emergency
10 and war headquarters;

11 d. Major NATO Commanders implement "MINIMIZE"
12 procedures within their respective commands as detailed
13 in ACP 121;

14 e. Permanent Early warning watch (where this does
15 not exist in peacetime);

16 f. Intensification of collection of intelligence;

17 g. Major NATO Commanders call for daily intelligence
18 summaries from national staffs;

19 h. Checking and completion of mobilization plans
20 and alert procedures;

21 i. Dispersal and protection, so far as possible,
22 of stockpile and logistic facilities;

23 j. Reduction in numbers of personnel in military
24 hospitals in forward areas;

25 k. Discreet preparations for possible implementation
26 of simple alert or Stage ORANGE or SCARLET measures;

27 l. Reduction or cancellation of leave outside
28 barracks areas except for special leave;

29 m. Restriction to barrack areas or barracks;

30 n. Units to be kept at maximum readiness, under
31 cover of exercises, in garrisons or training areas;

MC 67/1

-2-

Enclosure 2

NATO
SECRET

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 1 o. Lists of unit tradesmen and specialists to be
- 2 checked;
- 3 p. Equipment to be checked and issued as necessary,
- 4 and vehicles to be filled to capacity;
- 5 q. Dispersal areas to be reconnoitered;
- 6 r. Prepare reserve rations for issue;
- 7 s. Prepare mobilization ammunition for issue;
- 8 t. Loading exercises;
- 9 u. Signals exercises;
- 10 v. Alert exercises.

11 5. Declaration of the State of Military Vigilance. Major
 12 NATO Commanders may declare the state of military vigilance and
 13 may order implementation of specific measures subject to the
 14 following limitations:

15 a. The authority to declare the state of military
 16 vigilance or to order implementation of the specific
 17 measures of the state of military vigilance resides
 18 basically in the several sovereign NATO nations. Con-
 19 sequently, Major NATO Commanders will continue to conduct
 20 negotiations with individual nations, leading to prior
 21 agreement, in peacetime, authorizing the Major NATO
 22 Commanders to implement the measures of the state of
 23 military vigilance;

24 b. The authority of a Major NATO Commander to order
 25 the implementation of all or any portion of the state
 26 of military vigilance, including training exercises, is
 27 applicable only to assigned forces or component elements,
 28 whose national authorities have authorized the Major NATO
 29 Commander to order such implementation by those forces
 30 or elements;

31 c. For all other forces or component elements, the

NATO
SECRET

NATO
SECRET~~TOP SECRET~~

1 NATO Commander is required to promulgate the warning in
2 the form of a recommendation, to the nations contri-
3 buting those forces or elements, that the state of
4 military vigilance or portions thereof should be
5 implemented, including implementation for training
6 exercises. By previous instruction from his national
7 authorities, a national commander concerned, upon
8 receipt of the same warning message addressed to him
9 for information, would then be able to implement
10 immediately the measures applicable within the scope
11 of those instructions.

12 6. Command of Forces During the State of Military
13 Vigilance. In the event the state of military vigilance
14 is declared the prevailing command status of all forces,
15 including assigned forces, remains unaffected, unless
16 previously agreed otherwise by the Major NATO Commander and
17 national authorities concerned.

NATO
SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE 3

Pages 1 - 6, Incl.

THE COUNTER-SURPRISE MILITARY SYSTEM

1 1. Introduction. This Enclosure sets forth the counter-
2 surprise military system. It is complementary to the state of
3 military vigilance and the formal alert system. It is not a
4 substitute for either.

5 2. Purpose and Concept. The counter-surprise military
6 system is a system of defensive military actions which must be
7 taken to enable NATO forces to survive and retain the capability
8 to carry out their missions effectively under circumstances of
9 attack, or imminent attack, with little or no warning, which
10 circumstances cannot be met by the procedures of the formal
11 alert system. It consists of:

- 12 a. State ORANGE,
13 b. State SCARLET.

14 3. Applicability. The counter-surprise military system
15 has primary applicability in Allied Command Europe. Its use in
16 other Major NATO Commands is an optional matter to be determined
17 by the appropriate Major NATO Commander.

18 4. Basic Considerations. The urgent need for rapid
19 coordinated action in the face of an attack or imminent attack
20 is manifest:

- 21 a. Since the first warning of attack may be penetra-
22 tion of the radar screen, there may be only minutes
23 available in which to act. However, no matter how brief
24 the warning time something can always be done and every-
25 thing that can be done must be done;
26 b. All military forces are capable of swift action
27 if plans have been prepared and rehearsed, and if orders

NATO
SECRET

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE INSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

1 to place the plans in effect are received in time;

2 c. To realize fully the inherent capability of
3 military forces for swift action, the Major NATO Commanders
4 should have authority to declare in effect any state of the
5 counter-surprise military system and order implementation
6 of the specific measures listed thereunder without the
7 necessity of consulting with national governments at the
8 time of declaration. Otherwise it must be accepted that
9 military forces probably will not receive orders in time to
10 insure survival;

11 d. Many of the measures to be taken in the various
12 stages of alert are actions normally taken by military
13 forces engaged in training exercises. Consequently, they
14 can be rehearsed in connection with or under cover of
15 scheduled training exercises. Frequent rehearsals, in
16 addition to improving the efficiency of the system, make
17 practice alerts routine and commonplace, thereby reducing
18 the probability of any given practice alert resulting in
19 heightened tensions or in alarming the civilian populace.

20 5. State ORANGE

21 a. Definition. State ORANGE comprises the military
22 measures which should be applied by the NATO forces when
23 information received indicates a possible enemy attack
24 within a period of one or more hours;

25 b. General Principles. The measures to be taken
26 during this state are military measures which are not
27 intended for application over an extended period of time.
28 Serious disadvantages would result from the application of
29 certain measures for periods much greater than 36 hours.
30 If an attack is not received within about 36 hours after
31 State ORANGE is declared, the Major NATO Commanders will

MC 67/1

- 2 -

Enclosure 3

NATO
SECRET

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

need to make other arrangements. The measures can be practiced in connection with, or under cover of, scheduled training exercises;

c. Specific Measures. Action to be taken under State ORANGE includes:

(1) Manning of command post at war headquarters if not manned permanently in peacetime;

(2) Manning of communications network;

(3) Move of certain earmarked active military personnel, with their equipment, to operational locations (including move of mobile means of communications);

(4) Placing the control and reporting system on a full operational basis;

(5) Progressive setting up of radio nets;

(6) Placing wartime signal centers on a 24-hour basis;

(7) Activation of additional telephone and telegraph P1 circuits with minimum delay;

(8) Prepare to implement national radio transmission control plans;

(9) Units man armaments as appropriate;

(10) Dispersion of units from garrison, harbor, air base or other dangerously concentrated areas, and preparation of operational locations;

(11) Making all aircraft, missiles, vehicles, ships, weapons, etc., combat ready to maximum practical extent;

(12) Bring air force units to full operational readiness;

(13) Deploy nuclear counter action units to

TO: ~~SECRET~~

1 alternative operational positions and bring to full
2 operational readiness;

3 (14) Order security and active defense of
4 military installations to include anti-aircraft at
5 airfields;

6 (15) Implementation of prepared plans for
7 protection of stocks;

8 (16) Tactical dispersal of essential equipment
9 and supplies from air bases;

10 (17) Making logistical preparation to support
11 forces dispersed or in counter action role.

12 6. State SCARLET

13 a. Definition. State SCARLET comprises the military
14 measures which should be applied by the NATO forces when
15 information received indicates an enemy attack within a few
16 minutes;

17 b. General Principles. State SCARLET is an alarm
18 state which requires "crash" action. The measures to be
19 taken during this state are military measures. They can be
20 practiced in connection with, or under cover of, scheduled
21 training exercises;

22 c. Specific Measures. Measures to be applied
23 include:

24 (1) Movement of maximum personnel to war head-
25 quarters and other operational combat stations if not
26 already manned;

27 (2) Manning of maximum control and reporting
28 capacity;

29 (3) Implement national radio transmission control
30 plans;

31 (4) Aircraft and missiles ordered to maximum

~~SECRET~~
MC 67/1

- 4 -

Enclosure 3

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE INSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

readiness. Operational aircraft and missiles dispersed to alternate bases or launching sites; aircraft dispersed in the air, or held at runway readiness, as the situation requires. Aircraft may be dispatched on defensive operational sorties as required by the situation and in accordance with established policies;

(5) Protect other flyable aircraft by all feasible measures;

(6) Deploy nuclear counter action forces to operational positions;

(7) Disperse ships and naval aircraft;

(8) Disperse and/or shelter personnel not required for initial action;

(9) Implement if possible the measures listed under State ORANGE.

7. Declaration of Alerts. The Major NATO Commanders and their immediate subordinate commanders may call the State ORANGE or State SCARLET and may order implementation of the specific measures of those states, each for his respective command area, subject to the following limitations:

a. The authority to declare any state of alert, or to order implementation of measures under the various states of alert resides basically in the several sovereign NATO nations. Consequently, the Major NATO Commanders will continue to conduct negotiations with individual nations, leading to prior agreement, in peacetime, authorizing the Major NATO Commanders to implement the measures of the counter-surprise military system;

b. The authority of a Major NATO Commander to order the implementation of all or any portion of any stage of the counter-surprise military system, including training

exercises, is applicable only to assigned or earmarked forces or component elements, whose national authorities have authorized the Major NATO Commander to order such implementation by those forces or elements;

c. For all other forces or component elements, the NATO commander is required to promulgate the warning in the form of a recommendation, to the nations contributing those forces or elements, that the particular alert stage or portion thereof should be implemented, including implementation for training exercises. By previous instruction from his national authorities, a national commander concerned, upon receipt of the same warning message addressed to him for information, would then be able to implement immediately the measures applicable within the scope of those instructions.

8. Special Clause Pertaining to the Declaration of State SCARLET. Since the time available for the implementation of State SCARLET measures may be limited to only a few minutes, the Major NATO Commanders may, subject to the prior agreement of the nations concerned, delegate authority to declare State SCARLET to the Allied Tactical Air Forces and Army Group Commanders, and the commanders of comparable Allied naval forces.

9. Command of Forces. In the event the State ORANGE or State SCARLET is declared before the declaration of a reinforced alert, prevailing command status of all forces, including assigned forces, remains unaffected, unless previously agreed otherwise by the Major NATO Commander and national authorities concerned.

NATO
RESTRICTED

COPY NO. 1

30 November 1959

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE

COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

Standing Group

Groupe Permanent

CORRIGENDUM NO. 1

Pages 1

to MC 67/1

1. Holders of MC 67/1 (The NATO Alert System) are requested to replace pages 1-3, 6-9, 1-6 of Enclosure 1, and page 6 of Enclosure 3 with the attached pages.
2. Removed pages will be destroyed by burning or reducing to pulp.
3. This cover page is regraded RESTRICTED-NATO when attached pages have been removed.

FOR THE STANDING GROUP:

H. V. Fraser

H. V. FRASER
Colonel, British Army
Deputy Secretary

HVF/vv

NATO
SECRET

1 ENCLOSURE (8 pages)
Pages 1-3, 6-9, 1-6 of Encl 1,
and 6 of Encl 3 of MC 67/1

REGRADED _____
Per Authority DOCUMENT RECLASSIFICATION MEMO. #7
By JCR Date 9 Oct 68

DISTRIBUTION: same as for basic

MC 67/1 - Corrigendum No. 1

-1-

NATO
RESTRICTED

*without
pages
corrected
MS
16 Dec 59*

CONFIDENTIAL - NATO

COPY NO. 1

8 December 1959

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE

COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

Standing Group


Groupe Permanent

CORRIGENDUM NO. 2
to MC 67/1

Pages 1

Holders of MC 67/1 (The NATO Alert System) are requested to make the following pen and ink changes:

- ✓ a. Enclosure 1, page 1, line 30, after the period add:
"Action to be taken at this";
- ✓ b. Enclosure 1, page 5, line 20, read "governments"
instead of "government".


J. H. EAMAN
Colonel, Canadian Army
Acting Secretary

MPIS:w1

DISTRIBUTION: As for basic paper

CONFIDENTIAL - NATO - 1 -
MC 67/1 - Corrigendum No. 2

corrected
W.H. 3
16 Dec 59

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

NATO
RESTRICTED

COPY NO. 1

14 January 1960

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

CORRIGENDUM NO. 3

Pages 1
to MC 67/1

1. Holders of MC 67/1 (The NATO Alert System) are requested to replace pages 3, 8-9, and pages 1-6 of Enclosure 1 with the attached pages. Pages 1-2 of Enclosure 1 include the pen and ink change required by Corrigendum No. 2 issued 8 December 1959 which is hereby superseded; there are no other changes to these pages.

2. The removed pages will be destroyed by burning or reducing to pulp.

3. This cover page is regraded RESTRICTED-NATO when attached pages have been removed.

FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE:

Maurice E. Kaiser
MAURICE E. KAISER
Colonel, U.S. Army
Secretary

GHD/vv

NATO
SECRET

ENCLOSURES (5 page changes)
Pages 3, 8-9 and 1-6 of Encl
to MC 67/1

REGRADED _____
Per Authority _____ DOCUMENT RECLASSIFICATION MEMO. # 7
By *JCR* _____ Date *9 Oct 68*

DISTRIBUTION: same as for basic

MC 67/1 - Corrigendum No. 3

-1-

NATO
RESTRICTED

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE INSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

corrected
48
input 15 Jan 60
Pages

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

1

RESTRICTED

COPY NO. _____

18 January 1960

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

CORRIGENDUM NO. 4

Pages 1
to MC 67/1

1. Holders of MC 67/1 (The NATO Alert System) are requested to add the attached Enclosure 4 (pages 1-2, Incl.) which contains the Netherlands reservations on this document.

2. This cover page is regraded RESTRICTED-NATO when attached pages have been removed.

FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE:

Maurice E. Kaiser

MAURICE E. KAISER
Colonel, U.S. Army
Secretary

GHD/vv

ENCLOSURES (1 page change)
Enclosure 4 to MC 67/1

NATO
SECRET

REGRADED _____
DOCUMENT RECLASSIFICATION MEMO. # 7
Per Authority _____
By *JER* Date *9 Oct 68*

DISTRIBUTION: same as for basic

MC 67/1 - Corrigendum No. 4

-1-

NATO *unout*
RESTRICTED *Pages*

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE INSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

~~RESTRICTED~~
COPY NO. _____

1

~~TOP SECRET - COSMIC~~
25 February 1960

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

CORRIGENDUM NO. 5

Pages 1

to MC 67/1 (Military Decision)

1. Holders of MC 67/1 (Military Decision) (The NATO Alert System) are requested to replace page 1 (Military Decision), pages 3 and 4 of Enclosure 2, and pages 5 and 6 of Enclosure 3, with the attached pages, and to remove pages 1 and 2 of Enclosure 4.

2. Removed pages, including Enclosure 4, are to be destroyed by burning or reducing to pulp.

3. This cover page is regraded RESTRICTED - NATO when attached pages have been removed.

FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE:

Maurice E. Kaiser
MAURICE E. KAISER
Colonel, U. S. Army
Secretary

GHD:McC

REGRADED NATO SECRET

Per Authority DOCUMENT RECLASSIFICATION MEMO. #7

By JER Date 9 Oct 68

1 ENCLOSURE (3 page changes)
Page 1 (Military Decision),
pages 3 and 4 of Encl. 2 and
pages 5 and 6 of Encl. 3 to
MC 67/1 (Mil. Decision)

DISTRIBUTION: as for basic paper

~~TOP SECRET - COSMIC~~

- 1 -

MC 67/1 (Military Decision) - Corrigendum No. 5

corrected
JER
26 Feb 60
NATO
RESTRICTED
out
Page