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<u>2 July 1959</u>

Pages 1 - 10. Incl.

A REPORT BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

to the

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

on

THE NATO ALERT SYSTEM

References: a. SG 129/4 (Revised)(Final)  $\frac{b}{c}$ . MC 67 (Revised)(Final)  $\frac{c}{c}$ . MC 70 (Final)

# SECTION 1

SUMMARY

## INTRODUCTORY MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

l	1. The Military Committee has examined existing
2	guidance on development of measures to be taken in times
3	of tension and on or after warning of attack in the light
4	of MC 70 (Final), "The Minimum Essential Force Requirements,
5	1958-1963". Its detailed report is contained in Section II.
6	2. SG 129/4 (Revised)(Final), "Measures to be Taken on
7	and After Warning of an Attack", provided guidance on formal
8	alert measures. The ratification of the Paris Agreements,
9	the Austrian Treaty and questions that have been raised con-
10	cerning the interpretation of certain parts of the document
11	necessitate a revision of that paper. NATO REGRADED SECRET
	3 ENCLOSURES 1. The Formal Alert System 2. The State of Military Vigilance 3. The Counter-Surprise Military System
	DISTRIBUTION: A, B, C, D, E1-3, 9, 10, F, G, L
	-1- SECTION I MC 67/I NATO





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MC 67 (Revised) (Final), "Allied Command Europe 3. 1 Counter-Surprise Military Alert System", provided guidance 2 to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) for the 3 establishment of the Allied Command Europe Counter-Surprise 4 5 Military Alert System. Revision of that document is necessary 6 to reflect changes proposed by SACEUR and approved by the Standing Group. 7

8 4. MC 70 (Final) established a requirement for the review of present alert systems with a view to simplification 9 and unification thereof. 10

11 5. This report supersedes and replaces both SG 129/4 (Revised) (Final) and MC 67 (Revised) (Final), and consolidates 12 13 in one document military guidance concerning alert measures. It is a further step toward development of a comprehensive 14 15 alert system which will be responsive to military requirements in the foreseeable future, and toward the use, as far 16 as possible, of standardized alert measures and terminology 17 18 throughout NATO.

#### CONCLUSIONS

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6. The Military Committee concludes that: This report and its enclosures, setting out the a. formal alert system, the state of military vigilance and the counter-surprise military system, should be approved as guidance for the NATO alert system;

The authority to declare the various alert b. stages as set out in Enclosures 1, 2 and 3 should be confirmed;

¢. It is of the utmost importance that national authorities, to the maximum extent possible, delegate



1 in advance to Major NATO Commanders\* authority to order 2 the implementation of the individual measures of the 3 alert system. Negotiations between national authori-4 ties and Major NATO Commanders should continue to this 5 end.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

The Military Committee recommends that the North 7. Atlantic Council:

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
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Approve this report and its conclusions; a.

b. Request the Secretary General to establish and keep under continuing review procedures whereby the 10 Standing Group or the appropriate Major NATO Commander 11 can rapidly obtain political guidance on alert measures, 12 in times of tension and in the event of armed attack 13 14 or threat of armed attack against NATO, from the Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council 15 16 through the Secretary General or, in an extreme emergency, from the individual governments concerned. 17

\*SACEUR, SACLANT and the Allied Commanders-in-Chief Channel, as defined on page 7, MC 57/1. "Major commands" are their respective commands.





# SECTION II THE NATO ALERT SYSTEM

## THE PROBLEM

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1. To provide Major NATO Commanders with guidance for
 2 preparation of measures to be taken in times of tension and
 3 on or after warning of attack.

#### FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROBLEM

2. <u>a</u>. The Soviet capability for surprise and massive initial onslaught;

<u>b</u>. The existence of ballistic missiles capable of delivering mass destruction weapons against NATO with warning to NATO being measured in minutes;

<u>c</u>. The probable non-availability of an effective anti-ballistic missile missile system through the mid-1960s;

<u>d</u>. The wholly defensive nature of NATO and the deterrent mission and strategic concept of NATO forces, which mean that hostilities, if initiated, will be initiated by the Soviets and in all probability by a means and at a time and place of their choosing;

<u>e</u>. The reluctance of national authorities to release from national control, prior to the outbreak or imminent outbreak of hostilities, the authority to institute preparatory measures which could be considered unsettling, threatening or warlike;

f. The vital need for Major NATO Commanders to be given adequate authority to prepare and position NATO forces, when an attack may be imminent, so as to insure that they can survive and retain their capability to carry out their missions effectively.

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#### DISCUSSION

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3. A carefully thought out and accepted alert plan is essential to successful accomplishment of the defensive mission of NATO military forces. All protective measures that can possibly be taken prior to the outbreak of hostilities must be taken, particularly since an attack may occur with little or no warning. Failure to take necessary protective measures may well result in disaster.

8 It is recognized that many of these protective 4. measures have political implications. It is also recognized 9 that each government reserves to itself the authority to 10 commit its nation to war. If any appreciable period marks 11 the transition from peace to war, there may be time to get 12 political agreement to place the required preliminary 13 measures in effect. However, in view of the probability 14 that there will not be enough time to permit NATO nations 15 to meet and agree, Major NATO Commanders must have the 16 necessary authority in advance to direct the timely exe-17 cution of precautionary measures within the framework of 18 agreements previously reached with the governments concerned. 19 This procedure is entirely consistent with the very great 20 responsibilities which NATO nations have placed on the 21 Major NATO Commanders. It should not be construed as 22 superseding or abrogating the rights of national authorities 23 or higher NATO authority, but rather as a delegation of 24 authority to take certain necessary actions. 25

5. It is recognized that certain nations may withhold prior agreement on the execution of certain measures. Procedures should be established to facilitate prompt consideration and approval of any measures upon which nations have made reservations.

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Due to the many political implications, authority 6. 1 to declare an alert requires careful consideration. At the 2 outset it must be recognized that a military commander has 3 the right and the responsibility to take appropriate pro-4 tective measures for the security and the defense of his 5 command when his forces are imminently menaced. During a 6 critical period when the military forces are not imminently 7 menaced, but may be so at any moment, a situation could 8 9 exist under which implementation of certain alert measures possibly would affect adversely the chances for success of 10 political negotiations being conducted with the object of 11 preventing or delaying the outbreak of war. Under this 12 situation, military commanders must exercise the greatest 13 A situation also can be visualized under which 14 caution. political authorities might desire certain military demon-15 16 strations. Thus, it can be readily seen that there must 17 be the closest coordination and cooperation between mili-18 tary and political authorities, particularly in time of Military commanders must be kept informed of 19 crisis. 20 political views and objectives. Likewise, political authorities must be informed of the military appreciation of the 21 22 situation and, when appropriate, receive recommendations 23 from military authorities.

24 7. The nature and extent of political guidance to 25 NATO commanders in times of tension and in the event of 26 armed attack or threat of armed attack against NATO cannot 27 be defined in advance. The Standing Group, or the appro-28 priate Major NATO Commander concerned, should seek this 29 guidance from the Permanent Representatives to the North 30 Atlantic Council through the Secretary General or, in an 31 extreme emergency, from the individual governments concerned. 32 In situations of this character, time is of the utmost


NATO (Page revised by Corrig.No.1, 30 Nov 59) SECRENATO UNCLASSIFIED APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE importance. Procedures should, therefore, be established by
 which decisions can be conveyed through the Permanent Repre sentatives and the Secretary General to the Standing Group and
 the Major NATO Commanders with a minimum of delay.

8. In a sudden and extreme emergency, circumstances 5 6 may well arise where there will not be time for the Standing 7 Group or the Major NATO Commanders to obtain political guidance through the Council. It is a hard reality, demonstrated 8 by the arduous and protracted negotiations which have already 9 10 taken place between national authorities and the Major NATO Commanders, that nations are extremely reluctant in peacetime 11 to release from national control the authority to institute 12 preparatory measures which could be considered unsettling, 13 14 threatening or warlike. There is, however, a manifest urgent need for rapid coordinated action in the face of attack or 15 16 imminent attack (which may be delivered without previous warn-17 ing by ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads), to pre-18 serve the integrity and combat potential of the NATO forces. 19 Governments should, therefore, wherever constitutional pro-20 cedures allow, delegate to the Major NATO Commanders in peacetime sufficient authority to order the implementation of the 21 22 necessary measures to preserve the integrity and combat 23 potential of the forces of their respective commands in the 24 event of a sudden and extreme emergency. The survival of the 25 Free World may depend upon this delegation of authority.

9. <u>Transmission of Warning of Attack</u>. The requirement for the earliest possible warning of attack is recognized. The transmission of such information is dealt with in a separate document (SGM-537-57 with corrigenda).

## THE ALERT SYSTEM

30 10. The alert system set out below has been devised to
 31 assist in meeting these requirements. It is accepted that





certain aspects of the system may not be relevant or suitable for all the Major NATO Commands, and that Major NATO Commanders may omit such irrelevant and unsuitable aspects when preparing their own plans. However, Major NATO Commanders should coordinate their alert measures with each other, with a view to standardization of alert measures and terminology as far as possible.

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#### 11. The alert system consists of:

The Formal Alert System (Enclosure 1). a. This 10 provides for an orderly transition from peace to war in 11 circumstances marked by a period of deteriorating inter-12 national relations and more or less gradually mounting 13 tensions, possibly followed by declared or undeclared 14 hostilities. It consists of politcal and military 15 measures and is divided into three stages, Simple Alert, 16 Reinforced Alert and General Alert;

The State of Military Vigilance (Enclosure 2). <u>b</u>. This is designed for a period of delicate international relations and consists of purely military precautionary measures which can be kept up for a fairly long time without ill effects and which would facilitate a rapid transition, if necessary, to one of the stages of the formal alert system or the counter-surprise military system;

24 The Counter-Surprise Military System (Enclosure 3) с. 25 This comprises those purely military measures which must 26 be taken to enable NATO forces to survive and retain the 27 capability to carry out their missions effectively under 28 circumstances (attack or imminent attack with little or 29 no warning) which cannot be met by the procedures for 30 instituting the formal alert system. It is divided into 31 two stages, State ORANGE and State SCARLET.

32 12. Authority to Declare the Various Stages of the Alert 33 System. Ideally the authority to declare any stage of the





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alert system, which resides basically in the NATO nations, 1 should, for reasons of efficiency and urgency, be fully 2 delegated in advance to the Major NATO Commanders. 3 Tn 4 practice, however, it must be accepted that some nations 5 will be prepared to delegate their authority only to a 6 limited extent and under prescribed conditions. Negotiations 7 on these matters between the Major NATO Commanders and 8 nations have already taken place and should continue until delegation to the maximum extent possible is attained. 9 The 10 rules defining the authority or authorities empowered to 11 declare the various stages of the alert system have already been generally agreed in principle, although negotiations 12 on the individual measures are still in progress. 13 The rules are given in Enclosures 1, 2 and 3. 14

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15 If, within the general framework defined in paragraph 13. 16 7, Section II, one of the Major NATO Commanders has to ask directly for political guidance, he must immediately inform 17 In the event of an alert stage being 18 the Standing Group. declared by a commander, action must be taken immediately 19 to inform the authorities of the governments concerned, 20 senior and neighboring commanders, the NATO Council and the 21 Standing Group. 22

#### 14. Restrictions

<u>a</u>. Unless attacked, Major NATO Commanders and subordinates will exercise the greatest caution to insure that no act of theirs can be interpreted as initiating combat or providing the enemy with an excuse to level a charge of provocation against NATO;

b. Action to be taken during the different stages
of alert is subject to previous agreement between Major
NATO Commanders and national authorities.

-9- SECTION II (Page revised by Corrig.No.3, 14 Jan.60)

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As a general rule, no publicity will be initiated <u>c</u>. by military authorities with respect to the calling of any stage of alert or the implementation of any specific alert measures. However, military authorities must at all times bear in mind the possible public information implications of such actions and, when appropriate, make suitable recommendations to the political authorities concerned.

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Changes or Additions. 15.

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
Any changes or additions to the basic lists of a. measures contained in the Enclosures relating to the Formal Alert System (Enclosure 1) and Counter-Surprise Military System (Enclosure 3) will be submitted to the Standing Group for approval before any such revised lists are used either as a basis for negotiations or in issuing 16 a declaration of an alert;

The list of measures of the State of Military, 17 b. Vigilance (Enclosure 2) is a non-exhaustive list which 18 However, may be modified as circumstances warrant. 19 the Standing Group will be informed of any changes or 20 additions to the basic list of measures of the State 21 22 of Military Vigilance.

#### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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16. See Section I, paragraphs 6 and 7.





#### ENCLOSURE 1

Pages 1 - 7, Incl.

THE FORMAL ALERT SYSTEM

l Introduction. This Enclosure sets forth the formal l. alert system. 2

3 Purpose and Concept. The formal alert system is a 2. 4 system of political and military defensive and precautionary 5 measures which provides for an orderly transition from peace б to war in circumstances marked by a period of deteriorating 7 international relations and more or less gradually mounting 8 tensions possibly followed by declared or undeclared hostilities. The system consists of three stages: 9

Simple Alert, а.

b.

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Reinforced Alert,

General Alert. <u>c</u>.

During these stages the NATO forces will be brought progress-13 14 ively to a state of immediate readiness for war. Since the 15 exact amount of warning which will be received cannot be fore-16 seen, alert plans must be flexible. Measures to be taken in 17 each stage should not be considered absolute since certain 18 measures may be applied by the appropriate authority for authori-19 zing such measures at a stage earlier or later than planned. 20 The implementation of any selected measures from a later alert 21 stage on declaration of an earlier alert stage, even in an 22 emergency, requires the approval of the countries concerned, 23 which preferably should be arranged in advance.

## SPECIFIC MEASURES

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24 Measures taken on declaration of the Simple Alert. з. simple alert will place assigned forces in a state of combat 25 26 readiness and should bring forces earmarked for assignment to 27 maximum attainable readiness for war. The measures taken during 28 this stage should, if possible, be covert, but need not necessar-29 ly be so. No measures will be taken which might compromise or 30 disclose the overall operational plan. Action to be taken at this -1-Enclosure 1

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stage by Major NATO Commanders and/or national authorities, as
 previously agreed between them, includes:

a. Alerting and bringing assigned forces and their supporting units to effective strength, and bringing forces earmarked for assignment to the maximum attainable state of combat readiness, including the recall of personnel on leave or detached, and the return to the parent organization of units which have been detached for any reasons except operational;

b. Taking immediate precautionary measures against surprise attack;

<u>c</u>. Protection of key points and deployment of forces required for specific tasks of overriding importance;

d. Alerting personnel designated as reinforcements at a subsequent alert stage;

e. Implementation of the first stage of the communications-electronics plan, and preparation for the implementation of the national radio transmission control plans;

f. Guarding against sabotage;

 $\underline{g}$ . Preparation for the evacuation of selected noncombatants and certain categories of personnel from possible combat zones;

h. Increasing intelligence collection efforts. Preparations for taking known enemy agents into custody. Strengthening control of frontiers and intensifying surveillance of refugees;

<u>i</u>. Requesting activation of NATO and national wartime logistic agencies. Preliminary steps to place in effect wartime logistic arrangements and procedures;

32 <u>j</u>. Preparation for activation of NATO and national
 33 organizations for naval control of shipping; for





control of fishing vessels; and for dispersion and evacuation of merchant shipping;

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k. Bringing air defense systems up to strength;

1. Preparation for deployment of forces required for demolitions and minelaying;

m. Other purely military non-provocative measures considered necessary by the Major NATO Commanders.

8 Reinforced Alert. Measures taken on declaration of 4. the reinforced alert must result in the maximum possible 9 preparation to meet an attack. The measures required cannot 10 be accomplished covertly; therefore, this stage will be 11 initiated and completed only if there are conclusive indica-12 tions that the outbreak of hostilities is imminent/ However, 13 the full deployment of forces and other measures which may 14 have political implications or which might compromise or 15 16 disclose operational plans must be accomplished with the utmost caution consistent with the actual situation. The 17 implementation of these measures will require close coor-18 dination between the Major NATO Commanders and the national 19 political and military authorities concerned. Action to be 20 taken at this stage by the Major NATO Commanders and/or 21 national authorities, as previously agreed between them, 22 23 includes:

<u>a</u>. All measures indicated under the simple alert, if not previously effected;

26 The Major NATO Commanders and their immediate b. subordinate commanders assume operational command. Their 27 28 authority is exercised over the assigned forces and also 29 over the earmarked forces when the latter are assigned; c. Evacuation of selected non-combatants and 30 31 certain categories of personnel from potential combat 32 zones (if not previously achieved);



<u>d</u>. Implementation of wartime logistic arrangements and procedures. Withdrawal of any stockpiles remaining

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in advanced locations;

e. Implementation of the second stage of the communications-electronics plan; and implementation of the national radio transmission control plans, to the extent that prior national agreement can be obtained;

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<u>f</u>. Deployment of assigned air, ground and naval forces, and of such earmarked forces as are available, to operational areas; precautions to insure their logistic support and security;

<u>g</u>. Defense of ports, including denial of access to Soviet, satellite or suspicious shipping to Allied ports and harbors;

h. Final preparations for demolitions, flooding and land minelaying. Laying of defensive sea minefields;

<u>i</u>. Arrest or control of known or suspected enemy agents;

j. Institution, in conjunction with national authorities, of positive controls over air traffic, including civil aviation;

<u>k</u>. Institution of positive controls, over water transport, merchant shipping and fishing vessels;

1. Diversion, dispersal and evacuation of means of transportation, shipping and port equipment from threatened or exposed areas and ports;

m. Mobilization of certain Allied formations, with supporting units, urgently needed for reinforcing the coverture forces. Request for assignment of certain earmarked personnel;

31 <u>n</u>. Application of censorship and civilian movement
 32 control.

33 5. <u>General Alert</u>. This stage marks the outbreak of
 34 hostilities. On the declaration of a General Alert, operational
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plans are implemented in accordance with Major NATO Commanders<sup>1</sup> emergency defense plans. Initial actions to be taken by the Major NATO Commanders and/or national authorities under the general alert include:

<u>a.</u> All measures included under simple and reinforced alerts, if not previously taken;

b. Implementation of security plans;

<u>c</u>. Implementation of plans to control refugees or maintenance of measures taken at an earlier stage;

d. Implementation of demolition plans;

e. Implementation of communications-electronics plans and national radio transmission control plans, if not previously implemented;

f. Initiation of operations to carry out the emergency defense plans.

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
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## 6. Declaration of Alerts.

The simple alert normally will be declared by the a. Major NATO Commanders after obtaining approval of the governments through their Permanent Representatives on the NATO Council. In the event of a sudden and acute emergency, however, where the delay entailed in obtaining agreement of higher authority might endanger their forces, the Major NATO Commanders and their immediate subordinate commanders may declare a simple alert, either throughout their entire commands or in the affected areas as necessary. However, Major NATO Commanders and their immediate subordinate commanders ( may act only to the extent that authority to do so has been previously delegated by governments. The Major NATO Commanders and their immediate subordinate commanders must recommend to the national authorities the application of any measures which these authorities have reserved for their own decision;

<u>b.</u> The <u>reinforced alert</u> will be declared by the Major
 NATO Commanders normally after obtaining the approval
 of governments through their Permanent Representatives

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Enclosure 1



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on the Council. In the event that the situation is so urgent as to preclude obtaining prior approval through the Permanent Representatives to the Council, the Major NATO Commanders may, in consultation with the Standing Group and with the approval of the individual governments concerned, place in effect a reinforced alert or specific measures of this alert, either throughout their entire commands or in the affected areas as necessary;

<u>c</u>. The <u>general alert</u> shall be declared only upon the decision of the Council or on the authority of Permanent Representatives acting individually on behalf of their governments.

13 7. Action in the Event of Attack. Irrespective of the
14 extent of alert measures in effect, in the event of an armed
15 attack taking place anywhere in area defined in Article 6 of
16 the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949\* as amended by the

27 "Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof 28 shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such 29 measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken 30 the measures necessary to restore and maintain international 31 peace and security."

"ARTICLE 6. For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:
(1) on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Department of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

(2) on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer."

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-6- Enclosure 1 (Page revised by Corrig.No.3, 14 Jan.60)

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
<sup>17 \*&</sup>quot;ARTICLE 5. The Parties agree that an armed attack against one 18 or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered 19 an attack against them all; and consequently, they agree that, 20 if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of 21 the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by 22 Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the 23 Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually 24 and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems 25 necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 26 maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.



protocols relating to Greece, Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany, and pending the decisions of NATO nations in accordance with Article 5 of the Treaty, the following procedures will be followed:

<u>a</u>. Commanders of national forces attacked or menaced will, in carrying out their national responsibilities, conduct their operations in consonance with appropriate emergency defense plans of Major NATO Commanders;

b. At the same time, the Major NATO Commanders
 will call upon commanders of national forces and upon
 national authorities to carry out such of the alert
 measures not already in effect as the Major NATO Com manders deem necessary in appropriate areas of their
 commands.



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# ENCLOSURE 2 Pages 1 - 4, Incl.

## THE STATE OF MILITARY VIGILANCE

<u>Introduction</u>. This Enclosure sets forth the state
 of military vigilance. It is complementary to the formal
 alert system and the counter-surprise military system. It
 is not a substitute for either.

Purpose and Concept. The state of military vigilance 5 2. 6 is a state of readiness achieved by the adoption of certain 7 military precautionary measures during periods of delicate 8 international relations which do not warrant the implementa-9 tion of either the formal alert system or the counter-10 surprise military system, but which do warrant some pre-11 paratory action by the NATO forces. The purpose of the 12 state of military vigilance is to put the NATO forces in such 13 a posture as to be able to respond quickly to meet an emergency 14 situation. It facilitates passage, in case of necessity, 15 to one of the stages of the formal alert system or the 16 counter-surprise military system. The measures, of which 17 a non-exhaustive list is given below as a basis, can be 18 adapted to local conditions and are such that they can be 19 continued for several weeks, or even months, without major 20 disadvantages. It is possible to return from the state of 21 military vigilance to a normal military situation without difficulty as soon as the international situation has 22 improved sufficiently. The system can be rehearsed in 23 connection with, or under cover of, scheduled training 24 25 exercises.

26 3. <u>Applicability</u>. The state of military vigilance has 27 primary applicability in Allied Command Europe. Its use in







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1	other Major NATO Commands is an optional matter to be deter-
2	mined by the appropriate Major NATO Commander.
3	4. Specific Measures. Action to be taken at this state
4	includes:
5	a. Increased duty personnel at formation and unit
6	headquarters;
7	b. War headquarters to be manned by skeleton staff;
8	c. Progressive implementation of the emergency
9	communications plan, in line with manning of the emergency
10	and war headquarters;
11	d. Major NATO Commanders implement "MINIMIZE"
12	procedures within their respective commands as detailed
13	in ACP 121;
14	e. Permanent Early warning watch (where this does
15	not exist in peacetime);
16	f. Intensification of collection of intelligence;
17	g. Major NATO Commanders call for daily intelligence
18	summaries from national staffs;
19	h. Checking and completion of mobilization plans
20	and alert procedures;
21	i. Dispersal and protection, so far as possible,
22	of stockpile and logistic facilities;
23	j. Reduction in numbers of personnel in military
24	hospitals in forward areas;
25	$\underline{k}$ . Discreet preparations for possible implementation
26	of simple alert or Stage ORANGE or SCARLET measures;
27	1. Reduction or cancellation of leave outside
28	barracks areas except for special leave;
29	m. Restriction to barrack areas or barracks;
30	n. Units to be kept at maximum readiness, under
31	cover of exercises, in garrisons or training areas;
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N/4/1/ APFROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE 1 Lists of unit tradesmen and specialists to be 0. checked; 2 Equipment to be checked and issued as necessary, 3 p. 4 and vehicles to be filled to capacity; 5 Dispersal areas to be reconnoitered; q. 6 Prepare reserve rations for issue; r. Prepare mobilization ammunition for issue; 7 s. 8 t. Loading exercises; u. Signals exercises; 9 v. Alert exercises. 10 11 Declaration of the State of Military Vigilance. Major 5. 12 NATO Commanders may declare the state of military vigilance and may order implementation of specific measures subject to the 13 following limitations: 14 The authority to declare the state of military 15 a. vigilance or to order implementation of the specific 16 measures of the state of military vigilance resides 17 18 basically in the several sovereign NATO nations. Consequently, Major NATO Commanders will continue to conduct 19 20 negotiations with individual nations, leading to prior agreement, in peacetime, authorizing the Major NATO 21 Commanders to implement the measures of the state of 22 military vigilance; 23 24 The authority of a Major NATO Commander to order b. the implementation of all or any portion of the state 25 26 of military vigilance, including training exercises, is applicable only to assigned forces or component elements, 27 28 whose national authorities have authorized the Major NATO 29 Commander to order such implementation by those forces

c. For all other forces or component elements, the

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or elements;

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
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1 NATO Commander is required to promulgate the warning in 2 the form of a recommendation, to the nations contri-3 buting those forces or elements, that the state of 4 military vigilance or portions thereof should be 5 implemented, including implementation for training 6 exercises. By previous instruction from his national 7 authorities, a national commander concerned, upon 8 receipt of the same warning message addressed to him 9 for information, would then be able to implement 10 immediately the measures applicable within the scope 11 of those instructions.

6. <u>Command of Forces During the State of Military</u>
<u>Vigilance</u>. In the event the state of military vigilance
is declared the prevailing command status of all forces,
including assigned forces, remains unaffected, unless
previously agreed otherwise by the Major NATO Commander and
national authorities concerned.





## ENCLOSURE 3 Pages 1 - 6, Incl. THE COUNTER-SURPRISE MILITARY SYSTEM

<u>Introduction</u>. This Enclosure sets forth the counter surprise military system. It is complementary to the state of
 military vigilance and the formal alert system. It is not a
 substitute for either.

5 2. <u>Purpose and Concept</u>. The counter-surprise military 6 system is a system of defensive military actions which must be 7 taken to enable NATO forces to survive and retain the capability 8 to carry out their missions effectively under circumstances of 9 attack, or imminent attack, with little or no warning, which 10 circumstances cannot be met by the procedures of the formal 11 alert system. It consists of:

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a. State ORANGE,

b. State SCARLET.

<u>Applicability</u>. The counter-surprise military system
has primary applicability in Allied Command Europe. Its use in
other Major NATC Commands is an optional matter to be determined
by the appropriate Major NATO Commander.

4. <u>Basic Considerations</u>. The urgent need for rapid
coordinated action in the face of an attack or imminent attack
is manifest:

<u>a.</u> Since the first warning of attack may be penetration of the radar screen, there may be only minutes available in which to act. However, no matter how brief the warning time something can always be done and everything that can be done must be done;

<u>b</u>. All military forces are capable of swift action if plans have been prepared and rehearsed, and if orders

Enclosure 3



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to place the plans in effect are received in time; <u>c</u>. To realize fully the inherent capability of military forces for swift action, the Major NATO Commanders should have authority to declare in effect any state of the counter-surprise military system and order implementation of the specific measures listed thereunder without the necessity of consulting with national governments at the time of declaration. Otherwise it must be accepted that military forces probably will not receive orders in time to insure survival;

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<u>d</u>. Many of the measures to be taken in the various stages of alert are actions normally taken by military forces engaged in training exercises. Consequently, they can be rehearsed in connection with or under cover of scheduled training exercises. Frequent rehearsals, in addition to improving the efficiency of the system, make practice alerts routine and commonplace, thereby reducing the probability of any given practice alert resulting in heightened tensions or in alarming the civilian populace.

5. State ORANGE

<u>a.</u> <u>Definition</u>. State ORANGE comprises the military measures which should be applied by the NATO forces when information received indicates a possible enemy attack within a period of one or more hours;

b. <u>General Principles</u>. The measures to be taken during this state are military measures which are not intended for application over an extended period of time. Serious disadvantages would result from the application of certain measures for periods much greater than 36 hours. If an attack is not received within about 36 hours after State ORANGE is declared, the Major NATO Commanders will



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Enclosure 3



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l	need to make other arrangements. The measures can be	
2	practiced in connection with, or under cover of, scheduled	
3	training exercises;	
4	c. Specific Measures. Action to be taken under	
5	State ORANGE includes:	
6	(1) Manning of command post at war headquarters	
7	if not manned permanently in peacetime;	
8	(2) Manning of communications network;	
9	(3) Move of certain earmarked active military	
10	personnel, with their equipment, to operational	
11	locations (including move of mobile means of communi-	
12	cations);	
13	(4) Placing the control and reporting system on	
<b>4</b>	a full operational basis;	
15	(5) Progressive setting up of radio nets;	
16	(6) Placing wartime signal centers on a 24-hour	
17	basis;	
18	(7) Activation of additional telephone and	
19	telegraph Pl circuits with minimum delay;	
20	(8) Prepare to implement national radio trans-	
21	mission control plans;	
22	(9) Units man armaments as appropriate;	
23	(10) Dispersion of units from garrison, harbor,	
24	air base or other dangerously concentrated areas, and	
25	preparation of operational locations;	
26	(11) Making all aircraft, missiles, vehicles,	
27	ships, weapons, etc., combat ready to maximum	
28	practical extent;	
29	(12) Bring air force units to full operational	
30	readiness;	
31	(13) Deploy nuclear counter action units to	
	- 3 - Enclosure 3	
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1	alternative operational positions and bring to full
2	operational readiness;
3	(14) Order security and active defense of
4	military installations to include anti-aircraft at
5	airfields;
6	(15) Implementation of prepared plans for
7	protection of stocks;
8	(16) Tactical dispersal of essential equipment
,9	and supplies from air bases;
10	(17) Making logistical preparation to support
11	forces dispersed or in counter action role.
12	6. State SCARLET
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	measures which should be applied by the NATO forces when
15 <sub>)</sub> . 16	
	minutes;
17 18	<u>b.</u> <u>General Principles</u> . State SCARLET is an alarm
-	state which requires "crash" action. The measures to be
19	taken during this state are military measures. They can be
20	practiced in connection with, or under cover of, scheduled
21	training exercises;
22	<u>c</u> . <u>Specific Measures</u> . Measures to be applied
23	include:
<b>'</b> 24	(1) Movement of maximum personnel to war head-
25	quarters and other operational combat stations if not
26	already manned;
27	(2) Manning of maximum control and reporting
28	capacity;
29	(3) Implement national radio transmission control
30	plans;
31	(4) Aircraft and missiles ordered to maximum
	-4 - Enclosure 3
	MC 67/1

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readiness. Operational aircraft and missiles dis-1 persed to alternate bases or launching sites; aircraft 2 3 dispersed in the air, or held at runway readiness, as 4 the situation requires. Aircraft may be dispatched on defensive operational sorties as required by the 5 6 situation and in accordance with established policies; 7 (5) Protect other flyable aircraft by all 8 feasible measures; 9 (6) Deploy nuclear counter action forces to 10 operational positions; (7) Disperse ships and naval aircraft; 11 Disperse and/or shelter personnel not 12 (8) required for initial action; 13 14 (9) Implement if possible the measures listed 15 under State ORANGE. Declaration of Alerts. The Major NATO Commanders and 16 7. 17 their immediate subordinate commanders may call the State ORANGE 18 or State SCARLET and may order implementation of the specific measures of those states, each for his respective command area, 19 subject to the following limitations: 20 21 The authority to declare any state of alert, or а. to order implementation of measures under the various 22 states of alert resides basically in the several sovereign 23 24 NATO nations. Consequently, the Major NATO Commanders will continue to conduct negotiations with individual nations, 25 leading to prior agreement, in peacetime, authorizing the 26 Major NATO Commanders to implement the measures of the 27 28 counter-surprise military system;

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b. The authority of a Major NATO Commander to order the implementation of all or any portion of any stage of the counter-surprise military system, including training



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
exercises, is applicable only to assigned or earmarked forces or component elements, whose national authorities have authorized the Major NATO Commander to order such implementation by those forces or elements;

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<u>c</u>. For all other forces or component elements, the NATO commander is required to promulgate the warning in the form of a recommendation, to the nations contributing those forces or elements, that the particular alert stage or portion thereof should be implemented, including implementation for training exercises. By previous instruction from his national authorities, a national commander concerned, upon receipt of the same warning message addressed to him for information, would then be able to implement immediately the measures applicable within the scope of those instructions.

16 8. Special Clause Pertaining to the Declaration of 17 State SCARLET. Since the time available for the implementation 18 of State SCARLET measures may be limited to only a few minutes, 19 the Major NATO Commanders may, subject to the prior agreement 20 of the nations concerned, delegate authority to declare State 21 SCARLET to the Allied Tactical Air Forces and Army Group 22 Commanders, and the commanders of comparable Allied naval forces. 23

9. <u>Command of Forces</u>. In the event the State ORANGE or State SCARLET is declared before the declaration of a reinforced alert, prevailing command status of all forces, including assigned forces, remains unaffected, unless previously agreed otherwise by the Major NATO Commander and national authorities concerned.



30 November 1959

#### NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE

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COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

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CORRIGENDUM NO. 1

Pages 1

## to MC 67/1

1. Holders of MC 67/1 (The NATO Alert System) are requested to replace pages 1-3, 6-9, 1-6 of Enclosure 1, and page 6 of Enclosure 3 with the attached pages.

2. Removed pages will be destroyed by burning or reducing to pulp.

3. This cover page is regraded RESTRICTED-NATO when attached pages have been removed.

FOR THE STANDING GROUP:

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1. O. Tras

H. V. FRASER Colonel, British Army Deputy Secretary

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
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1 ENCLOSURE (8 pages) Pages 1-3, 6-9, 1-6 of Encl 1, and 6 of Encl 3 of MC 67/1

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MC 67/1 - Corrigendum No. 1



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8 December 1959

## NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE

COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

Standing Group

Groupe Permanent

# CORRIGENDUM NO. 2 to MC 67/1

## Pages 1

Holders of MC 67/1 (The NATO Alert System) are requested to make the following pen and ink changes:

Action to be taken at this";

b. Enclosure 1, page 5, line 20, read "governments" instead of "government".

H. EAMAN

Colonel, Canadian Army Acting Secretary

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<u>14 January 1960</u>

# NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

# CORRIGENDUM NO. 3 Pages 1 to MC 67/1

1. Holders of MC 67/1 (The NATO Alert System) are requested to replace pages 3, 8-9, and pages 1-6 of Enclosure 1 with the attached pages. Pages 1-2 of Enclosure 1 include the pen and ink change required by Corrigendum No. 2 issued 8 December 1959 which is hereby superseded; there are no other changes to these pages.

2. The removed pages will be destroyed by burning or reducing to pulp.

3. This cover page is regraded RESTRICTED-NATO when attached pages have been removed.

FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE:

une ZKa MAURICE E. KAISER Colonel, U.S. Army Secretary

GHD/vv

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ENCLOSURES (5 page changes) Pages 3, 8-9 and 1-6 of Encl to MC 67/1

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18 January 1960

# NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

CORRIGENDUM NO. 4

Pages 1

## to MC 67/1

1. Holders of MC 67/1 (The NATO Alert System) are requested to add the attached Enclosure 4 (pages 1-2, Incl.) which contains the Netherlands reservations on this document.

2. This cover page is regraded RESTRICTED-NATO when attached pages have been removed.

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
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MAURICE E. KAISER Colonel, U.S. Army Secretary


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ENCLOSURES (1 page change) Enclosure 4 to MC 67/1

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25 February 1960

# NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

## CORRIGENDUM NO. 5 Pages 1 to MC 67/1 (Military Decision)

1. Holders of MC 67/1 (Military Decision) (The NATO Alert System) are requested to replace page i (Military Decision), pages 3 and 4 of Enclosure 2, and pages 5 and 6 of Enclosure 3, with the attached pages, and to remove pages 1 and 2 of Enclosure 4.

2. Removed pages, including Enclosure 4, are to be destroyed by burning or reducing to pulp.

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FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE:

Janne MAURICE E. KAISER Colonel, U. S. Army

Secretary

GHD:McC

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Per Authorit@OCUMENT RECLASSIFICATION MEMO

\_ Date\_

1 ENCLOSURE (3 page changes) Page i (Military Decision), pages 3 and 4 of Encl. 2 and pages 5 and 6 of Encl. 3 to MC 67/1 (Mil. Decision)

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